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Abstract
With the recent debt crisis, the necessity of effective measures for safeguarding fiscal sus-
tainability has become patent, leading to an intense debate. Most of the debate focuses on
strengthening fiscal rules and restoring fiscal imbalances through austerity measures. In this
paper, I address two issues impeding the success of these measures: macroeconomic uncer-
tainty and fiscal policy reaction. Specifically, I apply a structural VAR model to characterize
the shocks to growth, inflation and interest rates. In combination with the estimation of fiscal
reaction functions, this allows for the application of a Monte Carlo-based approach for deriving
the distribution of uncertainty of fiscal realizations. Furthermore, the model quantifies fiscal
rule infringement risks and the distribution of the adjustment necessary to restore sustainabil-
ity. The model thus lends empirical support to recent literature emphasizing uncertainty as
essential to the appraisal of a country’s fiscal position. Results suggest that the Italian debt
path is typified by higher intrinsic uncertainty than its European counterparts. Yet, taking
into account the behavioral uncertainty of fiscal policy makers, Spain is the most likely country
not to live up to the debt brake in the medium-run. This may impel the enforcement of stricter
surveillance to hedge against disadvantageous outcomes.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, oil crises and ensuing recessions, political instability, and structural problems
have contributed to the deterioration of public finances worldwide. Furthermore, both the gradual
deregulation of the financial sector starting in the 1980s and the US housing bubble resulted in
a worldwide financial crisis from 2007 onwards. The subsequent bailouts of financial institutions
caused the public debt in the EMU to rise steeply. In addition, the public debt of some member
state countries was already at a high level in comparison to other developed countries. This led
the financial markets to argue that the public finances of some EMU member states had become
unsustainable, leading to a European debt crisis.
It is agreed upon by academics and practitioners that there is a necessity for effective fiscal
measures to safeguard the sustainability of public finances, but that they should not hamper eco-
nomic recovery. Although fiscal sustainability has a well-developed economic logic, there has been
less consensus on how to determine the stringency of the instruments called upon. The analysis
of budgetary targets is especially hindered by the uncertainty that is inherint in macroeconomic
forecasts. Given the importance of budgetary uncertainty, stochastic analysis of fiscal balances and
the resulting debt stocks is now common practice. The EC and IMF typically provide confidence
intervals for the budgetary projections in their Debt Sustainability Analyses (DSAs). Similarly,
fan-charts and scenario analyses of future debt paths are provided. The IMF’s World Economic
Outlook and the EC’s Sustainability Reports are prime examples.
More recently, policy advice is pushed towards constructing a probability function of public debt
using Monte Carlo simulations taking into account the uncertainty in economic growth rates, interest
rates and the policy makers’ discretionary reaction to increasing debt levels (see e.g. Celasun et al.,
2007; Budina and van Wijnbergen, 2008). Constructing a probabilistic model of the future path
of the fiscal balance and the resulting debt-to-GDP ratio provides useful insights on the required
stringency of fiscal targets. Nonetheless, the respective literature has mainly focused on the reaction
coefficient of the primary balance with regards to the debt-to-GDP ratio and has ignored the direct
implications for fiscal disciplinary measures.
A first objective of this paper is therefore to build on this methodology and arrive at enhanced
stochastic projections of EMU member states’ public finances. This is done by improving upon the
discretionary fiscal policy component in these models. For example, by considering the impact of
underlying institutional and macro-financial factors remedies the restricted specification of discre-
tionary fiscal policy changes that have been used up till now. Secondly, the model presented in this
paper allows for the application of Value-at-Risk measures and, more importantly, provides useful
insights with respect to the stringency of fiscal discipline. After all, little research has focused on
the complexity of achieving fiscal discipline under uncertainty. Thus, by incorporating the way
that different sources of uncertainty may influence the outlook of fiscal discipline, a fruitful research
environment is created. Thirdly, constructing a measure to evaluate whether medium-term bud-
getary targets - such as EMU member states’ Stability Programmes - are attainable will be a major
contribution of this paper. Hence, this paper provides ground for recommendations on whether
medium-term budgetary targets are too strict or actually insufficiently stringent.
The model is constructed as follows. First, the unexpected shocks to the macro variables in
the debt dynamics equation are characterized using the joint dynamics of their forecast errors,
which are derived from a vector autoregression (VAR) model. Specifically, this paper applies a
Monte Carlo-based probabilistic approach to derive the distribution of shocks to growth, inflation
and interest rates from their past shocks. Second, I analyze the stabilization of fiscal policy via
automatic stabilizers as well as its discretionary reaction to, among other things, public debt and
institutional rules. I illustrate the methodology by studying the case of 28 European countries.
Finally, putting both parts together by iterating the law of motion of debt forward leads to stochastic
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debt simulations. In particular, the model computes first the distribution of fiscal adjustment
necessary to restore sustainability and, second, risk measures that quantify the likelihood of fiscal
rule infringements of (i) member states’ Stability Programmes, (ii) the debt brake rule and (iii) the
adjustment path of the cyclically adjusted budget balance towards the medium-term objective.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section gives a more compre-
hensive overview of the research on which this paper builds. Section 3 outlines the methodology
and estimation of the building blocks underlying the probabilistic model. Furthermore, it presents
the resulting expected paths of the EMU’s future public finances. Next, section 4 proceeds to the
analysis of their implications for fiscal discipline. Section 5 presents robustness checks. Finally,
section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Literature
2.1 Fiscal Discipline
A frequently proposed way of achieving fiscal discipline and preventing profligacy is to implement
budgetary constraints, also called fiscal rules. In Europe fiscal rules regained attention during the
1990s due to their anti-inflationary role in the Treaty of Maastricht. The Treaty imposed, among
other entrance requirements, the necessity for candidate member states of the EMU to preclude
excessive budget deficits. Once the monetary union came into existence, the Stability and Growth
Pact retained the same constraint for the headline deficit and, additionally, required participants
to follow a medium-term budgetary stance close to balance or in surplus.
In 2005 a revision in favor of a more contextual approach (further) opened the door to a loosened
implementation. Whereas the headline deficit could still not exceed 3% of GDP, countries with a
debt rate below the benchmark (i.e. lower than 60% of GDP) could run a structural deficit of 1% of
GDP in the medium run (i.e. a Medium-Term Objective, MTO).1 Highly indebted countries, on the
other hand, had to achieve a structural balance or small surplus in the medium run. Since then all
Member States have had to reach their MTOs or be on an appropriate adjustment path towards it,
with an annual improvement in their structural balance of 0.5% of GDP. In the case that economic
growth exceeds expectations, this adjustment should be higher to allow for more flexibility during
economic downturns. The crisis-driven implementation of the Six-Pack, European Semester and
Fiscal Compact nonetheless revamped the focus on national budget balances.
Although the European Semester created an institutional formalization of the schedule for EMU
member states’ annual growth surveys, draft budgetary plans, Stability Programmes and the EC’s
country-specific recommendations to improve the coordination between macroeconomic circum-
stances, structural issues and budgeting, the Six-Pack and Fiscal Compact tightened national bud-
geting again. In particular under the Six-Pack, countries on their adjustment path towards the
MTO must also contain their expenditure growth at a rate lower than medium-term potential GDP
growth, unless matched by discretionary revenue measures. For member states at their MTO,
any excess growth of new expenditures over the reference rate of potential GDP growth must be
matched by discretionary revenue measures.2 Moreover, member states agreed to move towards
1The structural balance is defined as the cyclically adjusted budget balance (CABB) net of one-off and temporary
measures. In practice, the EC already used the CABB for the evaluation of member states’ fiscal policies from 2003
onwards.
2The MTO, however, has been redefined to entail a country-specific reference value for individual Member
States’ medium-term budgetary positions, defined in structural terms ensuring member states: (a) are on course
to a sustainable debt position, taking into account the economic and budgetary impact of ageing populations; and
(b) have adequate room for budgetary maneuver, in particular taking into account the needs for public investment.
The MTOs are updated every three years or more frequently if a member state has undergone a structural reform
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the MTO with more than 0.5% of GDP in the case of high indebtedness. Euro area countries that
are signatories to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (i.e. the Fiscal Compact)
additionally committed themselves to MTOs with a structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP or better,
unless the debt rate is significantly low and there are low risks for fiscal sustainability. The analysis
of the MTO or the adjustment path towards it under the preventive arm of the SGP is thus judged
by an assessment of the structural budget balance, complemented by an analysis of the growth rate
of net expenditures.
Next to the renewed (structural) budget balance requirements within the Six-Pack to prevent
an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), the member states adherence to the debt criterion was made
more binding via a debt brake rule. To prevent ending up in the EDP, countries with a debt rate
exceeding 60% of GDP have to reduce the difference by a minimum of 5 pp. per year over a period
of three years.3
Ultimately, despite its strong embeddedness in European policy, the debate on whether borrow-
ing constraints are a panacea still remains, as the jury is still out on whether they are too strict
or, on the contrary, not stringent enough. A vast number of studies have pointed to the positive
impact fiscal rules may have on fiscal balances (see e.g. EC, 2009; Debrun et al., 2008; Hallerberg
et al., 2007; Krogstrup and Wa¨lti, 2008). Moreover, the restrictive impact on public finances via
the preventative excessive deficit procedure ought to reduce susceptibility to unsustainability, aided
by the consequently enhanced predictability and the higher credibility of fiscal policy. Nonetheless,
serious criticism of the conception of EMU rules has been voiced (see e.g. Buiter et al., 1993) and
econometric identification problems remain a major concern. Additionally, the adverse impact of
fiscal rules on public investment is documented by, for example, Serve´n (2007) and Bacchiocchi et al.
(2011). Consequently, inferring the strictness and likeliness of the targets set out in (i) member
states’ Stability Programmes, (ii) the debt brake rule and (iii) the adjustment path towards the
MTO offers perspective to the debate.
2.2 Uncertainty
Uncertainty is ubiquitous and thus surrounds fiscal policy. The sustainability concept driving
disciplinary actions, for instance, is forward-looking, but uncertainty makes it difficult to assess
in practice. To compensate, stochastic analysis of fiscal balances and the resulting debt stocks
is now standard practice (see e.g. Chalk and Hemming, 2000; IMF, 2003; EC, 2012; IMF, 2012),
including: (a) sensitivity analyses (or stress tests), shocking variables driving public debt by two
standard deviations, i.e. providing a worst case scenario; and (b) scenario analyses, with less extreme
assumptions about the driving processes.
The traditional stochastic analyses, however, have several major shortcomings (Celasun et al.,
2007). By shocking the underlying variables separately the joint dynamics of the underlying macroe-
conomic variables are not necessarily respected. Moreover, each ad hoc debt trajectory on its own
has a zero probability of occurring in practice.
Recently, these shortcomings have been tackled by constructing a probability function of public
debt using Monte Carlo simulations taking into account the uncertainty in economic growth rates,
interest rates and policy makers’ discretionary reaction to increasing debt levels (see e.g. Celasun
et al., 2007; Budina and van Wijnbergen, 2008). Nonetheless, the respective literature has mainly
significantly impacting its public finances.
3Countries in the EDP are exempt from this requirement to prevent additional problems. Upon leaving the EDP
they enter into a three-year transition period requiring a minimum linear structural adjustment of the structural
balance to assure they end up on an acceptable adjustment path once this transition period is over. For example,
Belgium was required to adjust its balance by 0.33 pp. in 2014 to reach the MTO by 2016 and ensure that the high
debt ratio is put on a firm path downward.
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focused on the reaction coefficient of the primary balance with regards to the debt-to-GDP ratio
and has ignored the direct implications for fiscal disciplinary measures.
The fiscal rule literature, in its turn, mainly encompasses frameworks considering cyclical shocks,
showing how balanced budget rules forgo stabilization benefits, how simple deficit-output limits in
general encourage procyclical policy (when the economy is in intermediate states) and how cyclical
adjustments of the target balance are therefore necessary to allow for stabilization in the case of
adverse cyclical shocks. Next to ensuring fiscal sustainability, they ideally prevent a procyclical bias
in fiscal policy by forcing policy makers to build up reserves during booms (Perotti, 2007).
Output gap projections, moreover, have been found to be significantly biased upward in several
EMU member states (Jonung and Larch, 2006; Kempkes, 2012) as a result of their importance
for cyclical corrections. The resulting bias of fiscal and economic forecasts in the EMU member
states is found to depend strongly on the institutional setup, e.g. the design of the national budget
process (von Hagen, 2010). Fiscal rules, for instance, have been found to increase the probability of
accurate budget deficit projections and thus reduce policy uncertainty (Luechinger and Schaltegger,
2013). Nevertheless, the stochastic characteristics of the distribution of required fiscal adjustments
has hardly been taken into account.
This paper thus contributes to two strands of literature. Firstly, this paper is distinct from
the classical body of fiscal rule literature in its incorporation of macroeconomic uncertainty beyond
cyclical fluctuations as well as the practical application thereof. Secondly, its results are distinct
from traditional stochastic analyses in its analysis of fiscal rule infringement risks. Moreover, the
model extends the estimation of the discretionary fiscal policy component in these models.
3 Methodological Framework
This section provides a comprehensive breakdown of the methodological framework. I start by
deriving the law of motion of debt-to-GDP (section 3.1). This difference equation is solved iteratively
forward in time which allows me to establish a projection of future sovereign debt. However,
instead of considering one sole debt path, I simulate this equation numerous times under various
macroeconomic conditions. This allows for the stochastic characterization of the EMU member
states’ public finances.
In order to come to stochastic projections, the estimation of fiscal and non-fiscal determinants
must be separated due to, inter alia, the demand for more frequent than annual data by the
time-series techniques used for estimating the variance-covariance matrix of shocks in non-fiscal
determinants. In particular, country-specific vector autoregression (VAR) models are used to obtain
simulations of the non-fiscal variables, respecting the joint dynamics of macroeconomic variables
captured in past statistical trends (section 3.2). Next, an extended fiscal reaction function is
estimated to obtain the responses of fiscal policy to the simulated economic conditions (section
3.3). A major part of such behavior is captured by conditioning on institutional and macro-financial
controls as well as distinguishing between automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy.
In the end the quarterly VAR projections will be annualized and the corresponding debt paths
can be computed using the debt evolution equation, which relates the debt ratio in a certain year
with the debt ratio in the previous year, the primary balance (i.e. cyclical and discretionary fiscal
policy) and other non-fiscal determinants.
3.1 Fundamental Debt Dynamics
Historically, the prevailing fiscal balance and accompanying level of public debt have been the main
indicators recorded for the analysis of fiscal policy. In general, the law of motion of a government’s
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debt can be written as follows
Dt = (1 + rt)Dt−1 + PGt − Tt = (1 + rt)Dt−1 − PBt (1)
where Dt refers to the end-of-period public debt stock, rt is the nominal interest rate, PGt indicates
the public expenditures excluding interest payments, Tt indicates the public revenues and PBt
stands for the primary balance at time t.4
Since output evolves over time, influencing the government’s capacity to repay its debt, it is
appropriate to express the former in terms of GDP ratios. Consequently, dividing equation (1) by
real output yields
dt =
(1 + rt)dt−1
(1 + gt)(1 + pit)
− pbt (2)
where gt denotes the real GDP growth rate at time t and pit equals inflation, respectively.
5 Difference
equation (2) relates the debt ratio dt in a certain year t to the debt ratio in the previous year t− 1,
the primary balance as a percentage of GDP pbt (i.e. cyclical and discretionary fiscal policy) and
other non-fiscal determinants.
3.2 Non-fiscal Determinants
In keeping with the literature (see e.g. Garcia and Rigobon, 2004; Celasun et al., 2007; Budina and
van Wijnbergen, 2008; Tanner and Samake, 2008; Cherif and Hasanov, 2012; Tielens et al., 2014),
the baseline projections of the macroeconomic determinants, {gt, pit, rt}Tt=0, are constructed using
a reduced form vector auto-regression model.6 The VAR model also gives the estimated variance-
covariance matrix of the shocks in the debt dynamics’ non-fiscal determinants, Ω. Given their
role as key parameters in the standard debt evolution equation, the shocks to economic growth
rates, inflation rates and interest rates will be considered for generating alternative paths using
Monte Carlo simulation. Specifically, the reduced form country-specific model can be summarized
as follows:7
Xt = F1Xt−1 + ...+ FτXt−τ + ut (3)
with X ′t = [gt, pit, rt]
E[utu′t] = Ω
ut ∼ N (0,Ω)
Dickey-Fuller tests are used to test for stationarity and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is
used to select the lag lengths τ .
4Note that exceptional bailouts of, for instance, financial institutions are not included. Logically, such expenses
should be included in ∆Dt when they occur. Moreover, a more detailed law of motion would reflect that a government
endogenously decides on the maturity and currency structure of its debt. An unconstrained country is likely to time
the issue of public debt based on, for example, the interest rate. Overall, the omission of deficit-debt adjustments is
not precarious (ECB, 2007).
5Solving this dynamic equation recursively and inserting the no-Ponzi scheme transversality condition results in
the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC). For the econometric tests of the IBC a stationary real interest rate with
mean r and a constant growth of GDP is typically assumed.
6An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model could act as a valid alternative (see e.g. in ’t
Veld et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the theoretical soundness as a result of specific assumptions on variable interactions
in such structural macroeconomic models is traded off here against data coherence, in favor of the VAR framework.
7Other variables and shocks that are not part of the debt evolution equation still can have an impact on the debt
accumulation and their impact can be recovered by including them in the VAR model.
6
There is a wide range of techniques available to estimate a VAR model representative for EMU
member states. One could, for instance, estimate a panel VAR across all EMU member states.
However, there is little reason to believe that the parameters are stable across member states and,
given the small sample sizes in most member states, a random coefficient model would quickly
exhaust the available degrees of freedom. Hence, I illustrate the model by applying the algorithm
separately to data from five member states (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium), estimating
a VAR on quarterly data from 1980Q1 to 2014Q2. Descriptives and data sources are summarized
in table 13 in the appendix.
As mentioned above, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are used to test for stationarity.8 As ex-
pected, both GDP and inflation are non-stationary in levels. Interest rates are found to be I(0)
in most cases. The GDP series is therefore transformed into log differences and deseasonalized,
running it stationary. Similarly, the inflation and interest series are differenced if necessary to ob-
tain stationarity. Consequently, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 5% level
or below for all variables. The results for the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) as well as the results for the likelihood ratio test are documented in
table 15 in the appendix.
Typically, a recursive version of the VAR model is estimated in order to infer the structural
shocks (t):
AXt = B1Xt−1 + ...+BτXt−τ + t (4)
with Fl = A
−1Bl for a given l = 1, ..., τ
ut = A
−1t
In keeping with the literature, the stochastic simulations that follow employ a Choleski factorization
of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals (see e.g. Garcia and Rigobon, 2004). Specifically,
given the contemporaneous correlation of the errors, the estimated variance-covariance matrix is
decomposed as follows: Ωˆ = A−1A−1′, where A−1 is a 3 × 3 lower triangular matrix with the
standard deviations of the structural shocks on its main diagonal. Then, quarterly shocks for the
Monte Carlo simulations (˜) are obtained by multiplying A−1 by a 3 × 1 vector of random draws
from a standard normal distribution:9
˜ = A−1ζt (5)
where ζt ∼ N (0, 1)
Repeating this simulation algorithm N times for a time horizon of T years (i.e. T × 4 quarters)
results in 4NT vectors of ˜. In the application that follows, 2.000 simulations are performed over a
period of 5 years.10
8Nonetheless, the Phillips-Perron test, which is robust for unspecified autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in
the errors, results in the same conclusions.
9The factorization method is not sensitive to the ordering of variables in the VAR. Any Choleski decomposition
will produce the same reduced form variance-covariance matrix. The ordering nonetheless matters for estimating the
contemporaneous causality between macroeconomic variables. The ordering thus is only of interest for constructing
impulse responses. Since the focus here is on obtaining the best predictor of the joint dynamics of the macro variables,
I refrain from doing the latter. Section 5 moreover provides empirical endorsement for using the factorization in the
form of robustness checks.
10This approach differs from the stochastic debt projection methods by di Giovanni and Gardner (2008) and Berti
(2013), employed by the E.C. in its Sustainability Reports. Their approach differs from the aforementioned method
in that the shocks to the non-fiscal determinants of debt dynamics are extracted from the variance-covariance matrix
of historical shocks (assuming a joint normal distribution of the shocks), rather than from the estimated variance-
covariance matrix in the context of a VAR model. The resulting shocks are then used to define the impact of
uncertainty in macroeconomic conditions on public debt projections around a specific forecasted path.
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As a matter of illustration figure 1 shows the uncertainty underlying the non-fiscal determinants,
which will be used further on in the analysis, in the form of boxplots for each variable over the horizon
T . The boxplots are based on 2.000 period-by-period Monte Carlo simulations of the estimated
model using its estimated covariance matrix, Ωˆ, as specified in equation (5). The algorithm thus
straightforwardly allows for the construction of, for instance, the distribution for GDP and its
growth rate throughout time.
The model’s forecasting performance is to be evaluated. For succinctness, I restrict the discussion
to the German case. Table 1 focuses on pseudo out-of-sample forecasts over the period from 2010Q1
to 2014Q2. As a comparison, it portrays the root mean squared errors of a univariate model and a
vector autoregression model (each with four lags) and a random walk model. Table 1 indicates that
the VAR consistently improves upon the univariate and the random walk forecast for both the full
pseudo out-of-sample forecasts as a whole as well as for the rolling window forecasts. Accordingly,
the VAR approach seems suitable to tackle the problem.
Table 1: Root Mean Squared Errors of Simulated Pseudo Out-of-sample Forecasts
GDP growth Inflation Interest Rate
RW AR VAR RW AR VAR RW AR VAR
Full window 0.0172 0.0108 0.0080 0.0185 0.0142 0.0058 0.0147 0.0193 0.0119
2 quarters 0.0083 0.0085 0.0068 0.0070 0.0066 0.0060 0.0061 0.0062 0.0056
4 quarters 0.0065 0.0091 0.0067 0.0120 0.0104 0.0075 0.0102 0.0108 0.0092
8 quarters 0.0089 0.0114 0.0088 0.0268 0.0172 0.0131 0.0124 0.0146 0.0097
Notes: Entries are the root mean squared error of forecasts computed for a univariate model with four lags (AR), a
vector autoregression model with four lags (VAR) and a random walk model (RW). Each estimation was done using
Belgian data from 1980Q1 through the beginning of the forecast period, 2009Q4.
Finally, the application of a VAR for this purpose relies on the assumption of normality of the
residuals. Bootstrapping techniques can, however, be applied on the residuals to avoid making the
(restrictive) assumption of normality (see e.g. Burger et al., 2011; Medeiros, 2012). In particular,
for k input variables and a horizon of T years, k × T random numbers are generated repeatedly
until the generated and empirical distribution (using estimated parameters of the joint distribution
of all input variables) are sufficiently close. The corresponding alternative results are illustrated in
section 5 as well. For now a normal distribution is employed.
3.3 Fiscal Determinants
Given the simulated values for the macroeconomic variables, the fiscal policy component remains
to be obtained in order to solve equation (2) forward. In particular, the future primary balances as
a percentage of GDP need to be estimated. Doing so touches on two strands of literature. On one
hand, an indicator of fiscal policy - often, the budget balance or primary balance - is regressed on the
business cycle to infer the cyclical properties of the fiscal balance (see e.g. Gavin and Perotti, 1997;
Gal´ı and Perotti, 2003; Golinelli and Momigliano, 2009; Fata´s and Mihov, 2012). To determine the
fiscal stance’s role in stabilizing the economy, it is advisable to distinguish between the automatic
stabilizers inherent to public finances as legislated and discretionary fiscal policy, proxied by the
cyclically adjusted budget balance. Nonetheless, both are of interest here.
Closely related literature, on the other hand, estimates a fiscal reaction coefficient to test fiscal
solvency. More specifically, Bohn (1995, 1998) introduced a type of model-based sustainability
8
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Figure 1: Quarterly recursive VAR projections of Xt for 2014Q3-2018Q4. The boxplots are based
on 2.000 period-by-period Monte Carlo simulations of the estimated model from its estimated
covariance matrix, Ωˆ, as specified in equation (5).
analysis accounting for the interest rate implications of uncertainty and risk aversion. To assess
sustainability the primary balance is regressed on lagged debt and various controls. Finding that
the reaction coefficient on lagged debt is positive and statistically significant is a sufficient condition
for the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) to hold. At the moment of writing, the test is the
most common econometric test for sustainability. Other, more recent, applications of this approach
include, for instance, Mendoza and Ostry (2008) and Mauro et al. (2013).
As in preceding probabilistic models, the significance of public debt in determining discretionary
policy leads me to build on the model using lagged debt as introduced by Bohn (1998) to infer the
fiscal policy component of the model. To obtain the fiscal determinants of the debt dynamics
(i.e. the future primary balances), in what follows, I use an estimated fiscal reaction function to
incorporate fiscal policy responses directly into debt projections. Specifically, due to the scarcity
of budgetary data, an unbalanced panel of 28 countries over the period of 1995-2013 is used to
estimate the following specification for each member state i in the panel:11
pbi,t = β1di,t−1 + β2gi,t +B3Z ′i,t + εi,t, (6)
with εi,t = ηi + υi,t
where ηi denotes the country fixed effects and acts as an intercept. To account for the business cycle
gi,t, I use the output gap expressed as a percentage of potential GDP.
12 Note that the coefficient
β2 comprises the full fiscal stance, i.e. both the automatic stabilization entailed in public finances
as well as the discretionary policy measures decided on given (actual) business cycle fluctuations.
Subsection 3.3.4 isolates the discretionary policy. The set of controls covered by vector Zi,t is
discussed later on in more detail.
3.3.1 Estimation Results
Table 2 shows the main estimation results following equation (6). The fixed effects (FE) model and
the corresponding standard errors are estimated using a within-group transformation. Two addi-
tional tests relating to the consistency of the residuals were performed in order to check whether
υ ∼ i.i.d.(0,Ωυ). First, the residuals are tested for autocorrelation. Given the annual macroeco-
nomic time series used, within-country first-order autocorrelation of the error term is expected.
Second, the Breusch-Pagan test and White test are used to test for heteroskedasticity in the resid-
uals. Since heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are simultaneously found to be present in the
residuals, robust standard errors are constructed through clustering them by country.13 In fact, by
clustering along the cross section identifier, the resulting standard errors are completely robust to
any kind of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.14
11As for the non-fiscal determinants, the data structure of the panel, its sources and the descriptives are summa-
rized in tables 13 and 14 in the appendix. In order to save space, only the core countries are included, as they are
the focus of this paper. The 14 remaining countries of the periphery include: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
12Quite a few studies calculate the output gap using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (see e.g. Tielens et al., 2014).
The smoothing parameter λ of the HP-filter is then set at its standard value of 100 for data at the yearly frequency.
Given the limited length of the available series, I prefer to put my trust in the output gap provided by the AMECO
database itself instead of surmising the underlying trend.
13The Hausman test was used to test for fixed or random effects and supported the reported estimations. Its
results as well as those of the residual specification tests can be obtained from the author upon request.
14Stock and Watson (2008) argued that with fixed effects the cluster-robust estimator is preferred if serial cor-
relation is to be expected. Other parametric alternatives (e.g. heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-robust (HAC-
robust) estimators) often depend on the assumption of large T approximations. As illustrated by table 17 in the
appendix, for the IV-2SLS regressions the differences in results nonetheless are limited. Moreover, the results in table
2 are found to be on the more cautious side of the spectrum.
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Table 2: Static Fiscal Reaction Function
FE IV-2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
di,t−1 0.05** 0.05** 0.03 0.05** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.05** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
gi,t 0.53*** 0.28*** 0.26 0.28*** 0.73*** 0.34*** 0.43*** 0.33***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.16) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11)
pii,t 0.28 0.25
(0.36) (0.27)
ri,t -0.07 -0.13
(0.18) (0.14)
frii,t 0.68* 0.64*
(0.34) (0.34)
Country FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No of Obs. 431 431 282 403 397 422 280 394
No of Instr. 5 3 5 4
Hansen test 0.006 0.187 0.762 0.281
Reduced F 166.79 430.13 121.92 361.37
Adjusted R2 56.9% 67.3% 76.6% 70.7% 59.8% 68.7% 77.0% 72.3%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted primary budget balance (pbi,t) of the respective
countries. Country-clustered standard errors are noted in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Since
fixed effects are included, the table states the p-value corresponding to the F -test testing the null hypothesis
that all country or time effects are jointly zero. For the instrumental variable regressions the p-values of the
Sargan-Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions are reported, as well as the F -statistic of the reduced form.
The inclusion of the simultaneous output gap in the model requires instrumenting. For example,
one needs to be careful of reverse causality. Fiscal policy is bound to have an effect on output and
thus E[υi,tgi,t] = 0 will most likely not hold. Since there is no consensus on how to avoid the
endogeneity problem, several approaches are considered. The primary set of instruments (V ) for
the cycle includes a measure of the cycle in the U.S. as well as the lags of the regressors. The model
is estimated using the Anderson-Hsiao (1982) two-staged least squares (2SLS) levels estimator. At
this point no assumptions are made about E[υυ′|V ] = Ωυ, except on its existence. Accordingly,
the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions for the full instrument set
(i.e. the exogeneity assumption) are reported. Although less important in panel applications, since
realizations of time-varying explanatory variables in different time periods are potential instruments,
the tests give an indication of the validity of the employed instruments. This is a conclusion that
is supported by the coefficients and F -statistic (≥ 10) of the reduced form model that regresses
the endogenous variable on its instruments and exogenous counterparts, as suggested by Stock and
Watson (2006).
In accordance with previous literature, the coefficient on the output gap is found to be positive
and significant. On average, the primary balance is expected to increase by more than half a
percent as the output gap as a percentage of potential GDP grows one percent larger (cf. model
(5)). Allowing for jointly significant time effects serves a double purpose. It reduces the omitted-
variable bias and makes the assumption that there is no correlation in the idiosyncratic disturbances
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across countries more likely to hold. Specifically, it increases the variance of the primary balance
explained. Including time effects, nonetheless, results in a drop of the coefficient on the output gap,
i.e. the overall stance of fiscal policy is found to be less countercyclical (cf. model (6)). Finally,
the static models provide evidence for a limited response to previous evolutions in the public debt
stock, pointing to a sustainable stance according to the definition of Bohn (1998).
It is argued that, in practice, the adjustment of fiscal policy does not take place within one time
period (Gal´ı and Perotti, 2003; Claeys, 2006).15 As illustrated by equation (2), this effect would
have an unwanted impact on the coefficient on the lagged debt, β1 in equation (6). Furthermore, it
would explain the residual autocorrelation in the static models. Therefore, estimating the dynamic
counterparts of the former equations by including an autoregressive term of the dependent variable
may tackle this omitted variable bias. The Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator is
commonly used to estimate fixed effects models as it is numerically, but not computationally,
equivalent to a within group transformation. However, if the LSDV estimator is used to estimate a
dynamic model, results become biased. Just as the FE ordinary least squares estimator, the results
of the LSDV estimator may suffer from Nickell-bias in a dynamic setting (Nickell, 1981). In general,
the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the fixed effects in the error term. Inconsistency
occurs in panels with a large number of cross-sections over a fixed, small timeframe and increases
as the autoregressive coefficient becomes larger. The LSDV estimator, nonetheless, offers a bias-
corrected alternative (LSDVC) via the method proposed by Bruno (2005). Therefore, the following
equation is estimated using that bias correction to obtain the results in table 3:
pbi,t = β1pbi,t−1 + β2di,t−1 + β3gi,t +B3Z ′i,t + εi,t (7)
Although Monte Carlo evidence points to the superiority of the LSDVC estimator over the
generalized method of moments instrumental variable estimators (IV-GMM) in relatively narrow
dynamic panels as applied here, the presence of endogeneity justifies a comparison of results. In
order to do so, I use the difference IV-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), here-
after GMM-dif. The estimator instruments the differenced variables that are not strictly exogenous
with all their available lags in levels, and uses additional instruments such as the U.S. output gap.
Specifically, the two-step variant is estimated in combination with Windmeijer’s (2005) robust stan-
dard errors in order to provide a finite sample correction and consistency in the presence of any
pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within the panels.16
Table 3, nonetheless, also contains the system IV-GMM (GMM-sys) estimations as developed
by Blundell and Bond (1998). In comparison to the GMM-dif as initiated by Arellano and Bond
(1991), they are potentially less affected by the weak instrument problem (i.e. scarcely correlated
with the variables to be instrumented) with persistent data such as debt or the output gap.17
Moreover, GMM-sys might be preferred over GMM-dif if the autocorrelation coefficient in the
dynamic equation is close to unity (Verbeek, 2004), since lagged levels are poor instruments for first
differences if the variables are close to a random walk. The instruments taken up in the GMM-sys
are the lags of gi,t, di,t−1 and pbi,t−1 as well as the levels of the U.S. output gap.18 The number of
lags is collapsed and restricted to the second and third order (or earlier), as advised by Roodman
(2009a, 2009b), to preserve a parsimonious model.
15The non-stationarity of the pbt variable in the data at hand supports this argument.
16As for the static models, the p-values of the generalized Durbin-Watson autocorrelation test of the residuals are
used for the LSDVC-models. The Arellano-Bond equivalents are recorded for the IV-GMM estimations. The order of
the test depends on the model. For example, to check for AR(1) in levels, one has to look for AR(2) in the difference
equations of the IV-GMM estimations.
17Using the two-step approach in combination with the corrected standard errors can furthermore make the
two-step estimator more efficient than the one-step estimator, in particular for system GMM.
18Alternatively, (total) exports, imports, private consumption and exchange rates were considered as instruments.
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Table 3: Dynamic Fiscal Reaction Function
LSDVC IV-GMM
GMM-diff GMM-sys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
pbi,t−1 0.61*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.33*** 0.63*** 0.40** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.63*** 0.57*** 0.53***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14) (0.19) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
di,t−1 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
gi,t 0.32*** 0.13*** 0.16* 0.11*** 0.59*** 0.40*** 0.50*** 0.30*** 0.48*** 0.16** 0.24** 0.20**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
pii,t 0.23* 0.04 0.35 -0.28
(0.14) (0.06) (0.37) (0.22)
ri,t -0.08 0.19 0.19*
(0.12) (0.16) (0.09)
frii,t 0.33** -0.62 0.67**
(0.16) (0.72) (0.26)
Country FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.602 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
No of Obs. 426 426 280 398 397 397 254 369 426 426 280 398
No of Instr. 7 11 11 12 14 18 18 20
Hansen J-test 0.310 0.315 0.977 0.214 0.157 0.163 0.759 0.352
Reduced F 79.48 65.36 95.09 58.49 21.00 94.12 132.23 45.08
Goodness-of-fit 73.0% 80.8% 85.4% 83.3% 24.3% 48.1% 20.7% 32.4% 51.0% 71.4% 72.5% 69.5%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted primary budget balance (pbi,t) of the respective countries. Standard errors are noted in parentheses: * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In columns (1)-(4) bootstrapped standard errors following the bias-corrected alternative by Bruno (2005) are reported. For the IV-GMM models
in columns (5)-(12) two-step Windmeijer’s (2005) robust standard errors are reported. In the case that fixed effects are present the table states the p-value corresponding
to the F -test testing the null hypothesis that all country or time effects are jointly zero. For the instrumental variable regressions the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen tests
for overidentifying restrictions are reported, as well as the F -statistic of the reduced form. The goodness-of-fit is the squared correlation coefficient between the actual
and predicted values of the primary balance (see e.g. Bloom et al., 2007).
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The various dynamic models’ estimations in table 3 show that static results on the fiscal stance
still stand. The coefficient on the output gap, nonetheless, decreases considerably. Similarly, despite
the fact that the coefficient on the lagged debt is more significant, its size varies notably depending
on the approach. In the GMM-sys model the reaction to public debt, nonetheless, is non-existent.
Which model is then to be preferred? Undoubtedly, instrumenting is important for inferring on
the actual response to the business cycle. Furthermore, in comparison to the GMM-dif model,
the GMM-sys model is not only more efficient estimation-wise, but its results also show a higher
goodness-of-fit. Furthermore, the GMM-dif model residuals clearly deviate from white noise (cf.
the CumbyHuizinga test).
Regardless discretionary fiscal policy is not only characterized by the evolution of public debt
during previous periods, as suggested by the aforementioned stochastic projection models. For
example, the output gap, macro-financial factors (such as real exchange rates, interest rates, asset
prices and natural resource rents) and demographic and institutional factors (such as old-age de-
pendency ratios, quality of institutions, fiscal rules and IMF-supported stabilization programmes)
are found to have a significant effect on changes in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance
as well (Cevik and Teksoz, 2014). Theofilakou and Stournaras (2012) also look at the interaction
with financial markets. Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) look at institutional drivers, such as fiscal
rules and the degree of decentralization. In the same vein, Claeys et al. (2008), in turn, go deeper
into the fiscal federalism aspects based on the case of Germany. Hence, estimating a panel data
model that incorporates such variables as controls (Zt) is worthwhile.
Given the importance of interest rates and inflation as non-fiscal determinants, I first test for
their relevance using the third model of each estimation method. In general, both inflation and
interest rates seem to have little influence at the macro level. The long-term interest rate, as defined
by the EMU convergence criteria, is not found to be significant in any of the models but the GMM-
sys model. Next, only the LSDVC-model shows evidence of fiscal drag through bracket creep. In
other words, using this broad specification I found little evidence that inflation pushes income into
higher progressive tax brackets and consequently increases government revenues.
Including a measure of the institutional guarantees for fiscal discipline in the static models,
on the other hand, does seem to have a favorable impact on the primary balance. In particular,
the fiscal rule index designed by the European Commission measures the presence, enforceability
and strictness of the borrowing constraints of the member states. Incorporating the index into the
models results in findings that are in accordance with earlier findings on the matter (e.g. Afonso
and Hauptmeier (2009) who rely on LSDVC estimates). Specifically, the presence of stronger fiscal
rules is found to be effective, i.e. by improving primary balances. Interestingly, in the static models
the effect goes hand in hand with a significant effect of lagged debt. The dynamic LSDVC model
also finds a significant effect of both the lagged debt and institutional rules, albeit smaller. In the
GMM-dif model the significance of the index, however, disappears.19 Despite the lagged debt losing
its significance, the final dynamic instrumented model (GMM-sys) of table 3 does find a positive
and significant coefficient for the index as well. Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the
politically driven enforcement of institutional rules can counter countries’ gloomy public finances.
Employing the output gap in levels results in inferences on the impact of the position of the
economy vis-a´-vis its potential level and the distance from it. Alternatively, one could include the
rate of economic growth or a similar measure, such as the change in the output gap or the difference
between actual and trend growth. Doing so shifts the focus to whether the economy is in an upturn
19A possible explanation could be the lack of variation in the variable itself, which makes it harder for the models
to grasp its actual impact. This is a problem often observed with the use of indices. Yet, this does not seem to trouble
the other estimation methods. Therefore, a more likely and reasonable explanation would be the shortcomings of
the method itself.
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or a downturn and the respective intensity thereof.20 Tables 17 and 18 - for succinctness, appended
at the back - contain the estimation results for when the GDP growth rate is included instead.
By doing so, the overall explanatory power of the static models drops slightly, since the growth
elasticity is then found to be smaller than the elasticity of the economy vis-a´-vis its potential level.
In addition, the response to debt is slightly smaller. Despite the presence of lower di,t−1 coefficients
in the dynamic models as well, the difference in gi,t coefficients becomes negligible for some models
and possibly even larger for GDP growth than for the output gap.
Finally, in tables 4 and 5 the panel is subdivided into two subsets: the core and peripheral
European countries (see footnote 11).21 When doing so, the responsiveness to economic fluctuations
is generally found to be larger in the core countries. This fact is duly taken into account in
the analysis of fiscal discipline that follows. Data limitations prevent the formation of any solid
conclusions about the peripheral countries.
3.3.2 Analysis at the Component Level
Given that the budget balance is best subdivided according to fiscal revenues and public expendi-
tures in order to identify the cyclical component of the budget balance (based on the budgetary
sensitivities or elasticities as a result of automatic stabilizers), it is worthwhile to do the same
for the cyclically unadjusted primary budget balance used for the estimation of the discretionary
fiscal determinants (see e.g. Claeys, 2008). It may be the case that fiscal policy adjustments to
macro-financial, demographic and institutional factors might differ significantly for revenues and
expenditures.
Splitting up pbi,t into its components
pbi,t = ti,t − pgi,t (8)
where ti,t denotes the cyclically unadjusted public revenues as a percentage of GDP of country i at
time t and pgi,t denotes the corresponding primary expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Broadly
the following two equations can thus be estimated separately:
ti,t = β
t
1ti,t−1 + β
t
2di,t−1 +B
t
3Z
′
i,t−1 + ε
t
i,t (9)
pgi,t = β
g
1pgi,t−1 + β
g
2di,t−1 +B
g
3Z
′
i,t−1 + ε
g
i,t, (10)
where εji,t = η
j
i + υ
j
i,t with j ∈ {t, g}. The estimation results for the European core countries are
summarized in tables 6 and 7. According to expectations, the rate of public spending is found
to be negatively related to the output gap. In other words, as the state of the economy worsens,
expenditures as a percentage of GDP are bound to increase, and vice versa. Despite the relatively
small automatic stabilizers (e.g. unemployment payments) and thus small elasticity of nominal
expenditures, the elasticity of the rate is significant as a result of the effect in its denominator.
The negative sign on inflation follows this reasoning. As economies slow down, expenditures do not
only grow as a percentage of GDP, but inflation is generally lower. For public revenues the effects
are much less outspoken as there is a considerable output elasticity of nominal revenues in the
numerator as well. Finally, fiscal rules are again found to be effective. The strength of the imposed
fiscal rules is associated with decreased expenditures, while only the GMM-sys model points to a
positive and significant impact on the revenue side of the budget.
20For a more comprehensive overview of the possible model setups for gauging the cyclical reaction of fiscal policies
see Golinelli and Momigliano (2009).
21The last static model including the FRI is also shown in table 19 in the appendix.
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Table 4: Dynamic Fiscal Reaction Function: Core Countries
LSDVC IV-GMM
GMM-diff GMM-sys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
pbi,t−1 0.59*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.39*** 0.43*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.31*** 0.57*** 0.55*** 0.52***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12)
di,t−1 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.01** 0.01* 0.03* 0.01**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
gi,t 0.55*** 0.16* 0.18** 0.20** 0.81*** 0.60*** 0.39*** 0.48*** 0.84*** 0.40** 0.36* 0.28
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
pii,t 0.09 0.12 -0.18 -0.39**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.32) (0.18)
ri,t -0.08 0.24 0.08
(0.12) (0.17) (0.06)
frii,t 0.30 -0.47 0.33*
(0.23) (0.89) (0.17)
Country FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.301 0.035 0.156 0.103 0.043 0.001
No of Obs. 250 250 246 236 235 235 231 221 250 250 246 236
No of Instr. 7 11 11 12 14 18 18 20
Hansen J-test 0.917 0.377 0.453 0.214 0.311 0.341 0.854 0.987
Reduced F 64.12 50.92 44.70 40.62 60.59 93.25 106.61 115.62
Goodness-of-fit 78.8% 87.7% 87.6% 88.2% 29.9% 37.7% 51.2% 40.4% 56.9% 74.9% 73.9% 74.0%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted primary budget balance (pbi,t) of the respective countries. Standard errors are noted in parentheses: * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In columns (1)-(4) bootstrapped standard errors following the bias-corrected alternative by Bruno (2005) are reported. For the IV-GMM models
in columns (5)-(12) two-step Windmeijer’s (2005) robust standard errors are reported. In the case that fixed effects are present the table states the p-value corresponding
to the F -test testing the null hypothesis that all country or time effects are jointly zero. For the instrumental variable regressions the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen tests
for overidentifying restrictions are reported, as well as the F -statistic of the reduced form. The goodness-of-fit is the squared correlation coefficient between the actual
and predicted values of the primary balance (see e.g. Bloom et al., 2007).
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Table 5: Dynamic Fiscal Reaction Function: Peripheral Countries
LSDVC IV-GMM
GMM-diff GMM-sys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
pbi,t−1 0.45*** 0.59*** -0.43 0.55*** 0.21* 0.49* 0.59 0.43*** 0.34 0.44* 2.14*** 0.58***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.30) (0.08) (0.12) (0.29) (1.44) (0.16) (0.22) (0.22) (0.49) (0.19)
di,t−1 0.08*** 0.05** 0.04 0.06*** 0.12** 0.04 0.02 0.13*** -0.02* -0.02* -0.05 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.40) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
gi,t 0.26*** 0.14* 0.59 0.12* 0.38*** 0.25* 0.22 0.25*** 0.23* 0.13 -0.30 -0.00
(0.05) (0.07) (0.60) (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (1.59) (0.08) (0.12) (0.17) (0.45) (0.11)
pii,t -0.32 0.07 0.55 -0.93
(0.78) (0.07) (0.95) (0.89)
ri,t -0.24 -0.21 0.78
(1.06) 1.84 (0.89)
frii,t 0.41 -1.90 0.35
(0.29) (1.29) (0.42)
Country FE 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000
Time FE 0.000 0.620 0.000 0.311 0.475 0.086 0.002 0.007 0.000
No of Obs. 176 176 34 162 162 162 23 148 176 176 34 162
No of Instr. 7 11 11 12 14 18 18 20
Hansen J-test 0.425 0.573 1.000 0.391 0.299 0.386 1.000 0.950
Reduced F 89.37 119.40 5.73 146.53 35.53 82.81 935.78 393.36
Goodness-of-fit 53.2% 62.6% 75.0% 70.0% 6.2% 38.4% 3.2% 6.2% 29.4% 44.7% 21.0% 54.3%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted primary budget balance (pbi,t) of the respective countries. Standard errors are noted in parentheses:
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In columns (1)-(4) bootstrapped standard errors following the bias-corrected alternative by Bruno (2005) are reported. For
the IV-GMM models in columns (5)-(12) two-step Windmeijer’s (2005) robust standard errors are reported. In the case that fixed effects are present the table
states the p-value corresponding to the F -test testing the null hypothesis that all country or time effects are jointly zero. For the instrumental variable regressions
the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions are reported, as well as the F -statistic of the reduced form. The goodness-of-fit is the
squared correlation coefficient between the actual and predicted values of the primary balance (see e.g. Bloom et al., 2007).
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Table 6: Reaction Functions at the Component Level: Total Primary Expenditures
Static Dynamic
FE IV-2SLS LSDVC IV-GMM-sys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
pgi,t−1 0.61*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 1.15*** 1.06*** 1.04***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08)
di,t−1 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.05** -0.03** -0.03* -0.11*** -0.05 -0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
gi,t -0.98*** -0.55*** -0.70*** -1.36*** -0.45*** -0.73*** -0.63*** -0.28** -0.30** -0.41*** -0.31 -0.09
(0.15) (0.18) (0.23) (0.32) (0.16) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.33) (0.13)
pii,t -0.64 -0.49 -0.41** -0.48** 0.17
(0.58) (0.37) (0.20) (0.20) (0.76)
ri,t 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.04
(0.28) (0.25) (0.16) (0.23)
frii,t -0.75* -0.75*** -0.37 -0.28
(0.40) (0.34) (0.31) (0.74)
Country FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time FE 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.000
No of Obs. 252 248 238 238 248 238 252 248 238 252 248 238
No of Instr. 5 5 4 14 18 20
Hansen test 0.297 0.312 0.332 0.238 0.427 0.580
Reduced F 94.70 69.56 143.73 55.25 45.49 67.28
Goodness-of-fit 83.1% 86.8% 86.7% 81.6% 86.3% 86.3% 90.1% 91.9% 92.2% 74.1% 83.2% 86.7%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted primary expenditures as a percentage of GDP (pgi,t) of the respective countries. Standard errors are noted in parentheses:
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In columns (1)-(6) country-clustered standard errors are computed to correct for heteroskedasticiy and autocorrelation in the residuals. In
columns (7)-(9) bootstrapped alternatives following the bias-correction by Bruno (2005) are reported. For the IV-GMM models in columns (10)-(12) two-step Windmeijer’s (2005)
robust standard errors are reported. In the case that fixed effects are included, the table states the p-value corresponding to the F -test testing the null hypothesis that all country or
time effects are jointly zero. For the instrumental variable regressions the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions are reported, as well as the F -statistic
of the reduced form. The goodness-of-fit is the squared correlation coefficient between the actual and predicted values of the primary balance (see e.g. Bloom et al., 2007).
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Table 7: Reaction Functions at the Component Level: Total Revenues
Static Dynamic
FE IV-2SLS LSDVC IV-GMM-sys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ti,t−1 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.97***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
di,t−1 0.04** 0.02 0.04** 0.04** 0.04* 0.04** 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.02*** 0.02* 0.02***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
gi,t 0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.13* 0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.02
(0.08) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
pii,t 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.10
(0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12)
ri,t -0.17 -0.11 -0.02 -0.11*
0.20 (0.10) (0.07) (0.05)
frii,t -0.29 -0.26 0.01 0.25**
(0.35) (0.32) (0.14) (0.12)
Country FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time FE 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.053
No of Obs. 252 248 238 238 248 238 252 248 238 252 248 238
No of Instr. 5 5 4 14 14 16
Hansen test 0.458 0.403 0.237 0.340 0.157 0.546
Reduced F 94.70 243.49 146.32 52.77 12.03 108.33
Goodness-of-fit 96.1% 96.9% 96.5% 96.4% 96.6% 96.6% 98.2% 98.5% 98.4% 97.1% 97.0% 97.4%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted public revenues as a percentage of GDP (ti,t) of the respective countries. Standard errors are noted in
parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In columns (1)-(6) country-clustered standard errors are computed to correct for heteroskedasticiy and autocorrelation
in the residuals. In columns (7)-(9) bootstrapped alternatives following the bias-correction by Bruno (2005) are reported. For the IV-GMM models in columns
(10)-(12) two-step Windmeijer’s (2005) robust standard errors are reported. In the case that fixed effects are included, the table states the p-value corresponding to
the F -test testing the null hypothesis that all country or time effects are jointly zero. For the instrumental variable regressions the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen
tests for overidentifying restrictions are reported, as well as the F -statistic of the reduced form. The goodness-of-fit is the squared correlation coefficient between
the actual and predicted values of the primary balance (see e.g. Bloom et al., 2007).
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3.3.3 Fiscal Fatigue
As mentioned before, Bohn (1998) showed that a sufficient condition for fiscal sustainability is that
a country’s fiscal reaction function is characterised by primary balances that rises at least linearly
with past debt. Nonetheless, it has been argued that it cannot be that primary surpluses would
always keep pace with rising debt. In extremis this would require surpluses that exceed GDP.
Instead, Ghosh et al. (2013a, 2013b) and Medeiros, 2012 argue that “fiscal fatigue” sets in after the
public debt stock exceeds a particular debt ratio, whereby it becomes progressively more difficult
to keep increasing the primary surplus by raising taxes or lowering non-interest expenditures.
In order to test for this I re-estimate model (12) non-linearly for both the full sample as the
Table 8: Non-linear Fiscal Reaction Function (IV-GMM-sys)
Full Core
d = d¯ = quadr. cubic d = d¯ = d = d¯ = d¯ = 80% quadr. cubic
70% 75% 40% d = 40%
pbi,t−1 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.64*** 0.50*** 0.55*** 0.53** 0.51*** 0.47*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.24)
di,t−1 -0.01 -0.11* 0.00 0.03
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.11)
< d -0.00 0.01** -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
d < . < d¯ 0.02**
(0.01)
d¯ < 0.01 0.01 0.01** 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
d2i,t−1 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
d3i,t−1 -0.00* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
gi,t 0.20** 0.22*** 0.14 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.32* 0.38
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.23) (0.16) (0.21) (0.17) (0.32)
frii,t 0.56* 0.65** 0.81** 0.23 0.35* 0.19 0.38 0.32
(0.27) (0.24) (0.32) (0.25) (0.17) (0.27) (0.42) (0.37)
Time FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.163
No of Obs. 398 398 398 236 236 236 236 236
No of Instr. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Hansen test 0.251 0.164 0.068 0.981 0.978 0.972 0.976 0.964
Reduced F 45.08 45.08 45.08 115.62 115.62 115.62 115.62 115.62
Adjusted R2 71.7% 72.1% 68.0% 73.2% 74.5% 73.8% 74.0% 73.3%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted primary budget balance (pbi,t) of the respective countries.
Standard errors are noted in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications were estimated using
IV-GMM-sys. Two-step Windmeijer’s (2005) robust standard errors are reported. Additionally, the p-values of the
Sargan-Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions are reported, as well as the F -statistic of the reduced form. The
goodness-of-fit is the squared correlation coefficient between the actual and predicted values of the primary balance
(see e.g. Bloom et al., 2007).
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subset of core countries. In particular, the coefficient of lagged debt is made contingent on the
debt rate itself by including interaction terms. Alternatively, quadratic and cubic specifications are
tested. The results are included in table 8.
Given the insignificant and negligible coeffecient on debt for the full sample in table 3 unsur-
prisingly no significant effect is found here either. Only a cubic function seems to point towards
its presence. To facilitate the interpretation of the equation it is fitted to the data in figure 12
in the appendix. The fatigue would kick in as the debt rate approaches 130%, much later than
the range of 80-100% of earlier studies. Nonethless, at these levels the number of observations is
limited, thereby making the estimation unstable. The effect moreover disappears for the subset of
core European countries. The small effect initially found for the core countries in table 4 does show
non-linearities in case of the interaction equations. Overall, the evidence on fiscal fatigue, however,
is limited.
3.3.4 A Break Down of the Fiscal Stance
Denote the cyclically adjusted budget balance of country i in period t, expressed as a percentage
of its GDP, as capbi,t and the automatic stabilizers as asi,t. Since
pbi,t ≡ capbi,t + asi,t (11)
holds by definition, the aforementioned coefficients on gi,t comprised both automatic stabilizers
and discretionary policy. Even though equation (6) is appropriate for model-based sustainability
analysis and gets us a long way, it seems worthwhile to break down fiscal stance further for the
current application. After all, incorporating lagged debt is insufficient to fully describe discretionary
policy.22 Therefore, instead of equation (6), I now estimate:
capbi,t = β1di,t−1 + β2gi,t +B3Z ′i,t + εi,t (12)
with εi,t = ηi + υi,t
Equation (12) is thus designed to only capture discretionary policy. Consequently, estimating
equation (12) allows me to single out discretionary policy more correctly in the stochastic debt
projections. The CABB can thus be identified separately, allowing for the analysis of the MTOs
imposed on it.
As shown in table 9, if there is any impact of output - in addition to automatic stabilizers -
it is expected to be negative. In other words, discretionary policy is found to be procyclical on
average, especially in peripheral countries. Furthermore, the previous period debt rate plays a
significant role in determining discretionary policy in core European countries. As the debt rate
grows larger, discretionary public finances become stricter. In the same vein, instrumenting to
overcome endogeneity proves the effectiveness of fiscal rules in constraining discretionary policy.
Finally, as a robustness check, the covariance of the budget balance with the business cycle
driving the cyclical components can be compared to the budget sensitivities or semi-elasticities used
by, for example, the European Commission for computing structural balances (see e.g. Girouard
and Andre´, 2005; Larch and Turrini, 2009; Mourre et al., 2013; Mourre et al., 2014). The values
found above are sufficiently close to the EU-28 averages found by the E.C., therefore bolstering
trust in the empirical findings.
22Carnot and de Castro (2015), nonetheless, derive the methodological difference between the structural (primary)
balance and the actual discretionary fiscal effort. Overall, the differences are found to be rather small in practice.
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Table 9: Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal Reaction Function
LSDVC IV-GMM-sys
Core Per. Full Core Per. Full
capbi,t−1 0.68*** 0.53*** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.49*** 0.60***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.12) (0.21) (0.13)
di,t−1 0.04** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.02** 0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
gi,t -0.07 -0.13 -0.12*** 0.07 -0.29** -0.12*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.22) (0.10) (0.07)
pii,t 0.22 0.12* 0.11* -0.41 -0.00 0.06
(0.17) (0.07) (0.06) (0.28) (0.13) (0.09)
frii,t 0.38 0.25 0.33* 0.25 1.05 0.42**
(0.24) (0.32) (0.18) (0.20) (1.22) (0.20)
Country FE 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time FE 0.000 0.342 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No of Obs. 236 154 390 236 154 390
No of Instr. 20 20 20
Hansen test 0.958 0.999 0.308
Reduced F 114.29 36.38 26.47
Adjusted R2 82.4% 67.9% 79.9% 68.9% 43.2% 68.8%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (pbi,t) of
the respective countries. Standard errors are noted in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. In columns (1)-(3) bootstrapped standard errors following the bias-corrected
alternative by Bruno (2005) are reported. For the IV-GMM models in columns (4)-(6)
two-step Windmeijer’s (2005) robust standard errors are reported. In the case that fixed
effects are present the table states the p-value corresponding to the F -test testing the null
hypothesis that all country or time effects are jointly zero. For the instrumental variable
regressions the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions are re-
ported, as well as the F -statistic of the reduced form. The goodness-of-fit is the squared
correlation coefficient between the actual and predicted values of the primary balance (see
e.g. Bloom et al., 2007).
3.4 Stochastic Projections of EMU Public Finances
In order to obtain the projected paths of public finances, random vectors of shocks to the non-fiscal
determinants of debt dynamics are generated for each projection year and these, together with
the estimated coefficients of the VAR model, are used to project the (non-fiscal) macroeconomic
variables into the future. The path of the debt-to-GDP ratio corresponding to each sequence of
simulated shock vectors (i.e. one vector per projection year) is then obtained through the standard
debt evolution equation, which relates the debt ratio in a certain year to the primary balance and
the debt ratio of the previous year.
The above described algorithm will produce as many debt paths as the number of simulated
shock constellations. In particular, I perform 2.000 period-by-period Monte Carlo simulations of the
estimated model using its estimated covariance matrix. Hence, based on the stochastic realizations
of key debt determinants and accounting for their variances and covariances structure, the entire
distribution of debt stocks over a medium-term horizon can be constructed. Consequently, this
approach will also allow for the application of Value-at-Risk measures of fiscal sustainability (see
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e.g. Barnhill and Kopits, 2003; EC, 2011; van Ewijk et al., 2013) as pioneered in financial economics
(Jorion, 2007). Moreover, the algorithm can incorporate any number of distributional assumptions
on fat tails and asymmetries, though the default assumption is a normal distribution.
The simulated paths for the five European countries their end-of-year public debt rates that can
be expected to evolve over the period from 2014 to 2018, are displayed in figure 2. The different
colors of the shaded areas portray the different deciles of the projections, which are based on 2.000
period-by-period Monte Carlo simulations of the estimated probabilistic model (as illustrated in
figure 1). A more detailed account of the deciles is given in table 20 in the appendix. Figure 3,
moreover, plots the histograms for the public debt stock as a percentage of GDP at the end of
2018. Additionally, as a way of illustration, it also plots the movement in the distribution of the
stochastic debt rate simulations over the period of 2014-2018 for the case of Belgium.
For the benchmark simulation the fiscal reaction model (12) from table 4 was employed. After
all, given the member states considered in the analysis, using the simulations for the core countries
is more appropriate. The required output gap expressed as a percentage of potential GDP is
constructed by using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The smoothing parameter λ of the HP-filter is
set at its standard value 1600 for data at the quarterly frequency. Next to its reasonable goodness-
of-fit, model (12) can be considered the more cautious option as policymakers’ reactions to public
debt evolutions and the output gap remain limited.23 Nevertheless, other alternatives are discussed
in subsection 5.2 as well.
4 Analysis of Fiscal Discipline
The design of efficient and effective borrowing constraints has been the center of debate for several
decades. In practice, long-term fiscal sustainability indicators are the main drivers for fiscal rules,
but they offer little to no operational goals for the short-run. Therefore, shedding light on, for
instance, the short to medium-term probability that constraints are adhered to will provide useful
guidelines for policy makers in the process of implementing or revising such measures.
In particular, using the model one can make several inferences about the implied risk for fiscal
discipline. First, along the lines set out by Value-at-Risk analysis, the likelihood of certain future
debt scenarios and the upward risk of the public debt stock can be quantified (section 4.1). Second,
the model can be simulated to find the uncertainty that would remain under the assumption that
member states closely stick to the Stability Programmes’ targets. Specifically, one can compute
the ceteris paribus probability that member states will be able to adhere to their objectives. Or,
complimentarily, it can give the distribution of the fiscal adjustment necessary to restore stability.
Similarly, one can compute the probability that targets set by the European Commission, such as
the debt brake rule and MTO adjustment path, are achieved. Thus, the model results in a reliable
measure of whether the rules are attainable under the variances and covariances structure of the
macroeconomic variables (section 4.2). The resulting infringement risk measures would allow policy
makers to come to recommendations as to whether the budgetary targets are overly strict or, in the
opposite case, insufficiently stringent. Third, the model and the resulting measures can be extended
to include policy related uncertainty as well as uncertainty from macroeconomic variables (section
4.3).
23It does require the assumption that the strength of fiscal rules remains constant. Simulations in general, however,
rely on the assumption that future policy is sufficiently characterized by past behavior.
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Figure 2: Yearly stochastic simulations of the public debt stock as a percentage of GDP for 2014-
2018. Shaded areas portray the deciles of the projections, with different colors delineating different
deciles. The deciles are based on 2.000 period-by-period Monte Carlo simulations of the estimated
model. Panel (f) compares the changes in debt rate found compared to their historical values.
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Figure 3: Stochastic simulations of the public debt stock as a percentage of GDP at the end
of 2018. Each histogram plots the number of occurrences of a certain debt rate based on 2.000
period-by-period Monte Carlo simulations of the estimated model. The full line portrays the fitted
kernel. Panel (f) illustrates the movement of the distribution over the period of 2014-2018 for the
case of Belgium.
4.1 Value-at-Risk Measures
There are no certain forecasts. Hence, we are interested in the probabilities of future realizations.
Obviously, the distribution of debt stocks can be used to make inferences about the likelihood of
certain future scenarios. For example, what is the ceteris paribus probability that the debt level
in a certain EMU member state will (still) exceed 100 per cent of GDP in 2018? As illustrated by
figure 2 and detailed further in table 20, this probability is highest for Italy.
Other interesting indicators can be constructed using the stochastic simulations as well. For
instance, van Ewijk et al. (2013) construct an ’at risk’ indicator, which is the difference between (a)
the debt level in ten years that is higher than 97.5 per cent of all simulated debt levels and (b) the
median debt level in ten years. Therefore, their measure indicates the likely deviation of the upward
dispersion in the debt simulation. A similar measure can be computed for a 5 year horizon using the
model in this paper. In line with the results of the variance decomposition, France (7.7), Belgium
(11.1) and Germany (15.7) show a much smaller probability of upward risk than Spain (30.8) and
Italy (67.3). In the case of bootstrapped shocks the degree of risk increases for all countries but
Italy: France (12.2), Belgium (17.1), Germany (22.1), Italy (39.7) and Spain (45.5).
Nonetheless, apart from the direction of medium-term debt rates, these indicators do not consti-
tute a strategy to ultimately satisfy the IBC. In order to substantiate disciplinary measures, more
specific policy recommendations with respect to medium-term objectives (such as the MTOs in
the preventative arm of the European Commission’s fiscal policy oversight), however, seem to be a
logical step forward. Especially given the pressing need to commit to solvent fiscal policies and the
predominance of fiscal rules, this can be seen as the appropriate instrument to reach this goal.
4.2 Fiscal Rule Infringement Risks
As an interesting point of comparison, the mean of the benchmark model is plotted against the
projections by the respective national administrations or institutes, as included in the Stability
Programmes (SP), in figure 4. Specifically, a scenario with the macro simulations from section
3.2 and the fiscal goals from the Stability Programmes is computed. Additionally, the complete
SP-scenarios, including the underlying macro forecasts from the national administrations, is plot-
ted. Interestingly, the differences between both scenarios are limited, indicating that the macro
projections from section 3.2 differ little from those used by national administrations. Furthermore,
it is striking to see how close the model’s expected German, Italian and Belgian paths are to those
set out in these member states’ Stability Programmes, especially in the short-run. Hence, the
programme goals set by these countries seem to follow historical fiscal behavior.
French and Spanish goals, nonetheless, provide more fiscal leeway in the short-run. Only after
two to three years do they return to a slope in accordance to that found in historical fiscal reactions.
The case for a yearly balanced primary budget is shown as an additional point of reference. The
implications of uncertainty for the scenarios discussed above is presented next.
Figure 5 illustrates the probability distribution of the discrepancy between the simulated debt
stock as a percentage of GDP and the one intended by each country based on its Stability Pro-
gramme. In other words, it portrays the cumulative adjustment required to adhere to the Stability
Programmes’ debt targets. The additionally required, yearly adjustments to the primary balance
as a percentage of GDP are shown in figure 6. In particular, the cases of infringement and, thus,
the need for additional efforts are indicated in red. The first panel of table 10 summarizes the
charts into a yearly risk measure by summing the probabilities of the breaches, i.e. the red bars.
The results seem to be in favor of France and Spain. Nevertheless, the caveat is that, that their
programmes are less ambitious. Not surprisingly, their goals are thus found to be achievable with
more certainty.
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Figure 4: A comparison of the expected paths of the public debt stock as a percentage of GDP
based on (i) the benchmark model’s stochastic simulations; (ii) the Stability Programmes’ fiscal
targets in combination with own macro forecasts; (iii) the Stability Programmes’ fiscal targets and
the underlying macro projections; and (iv) a balanced primary budget.
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Figure 5: The probability distribution of the difference between the simulated and the intended
debt stock as a percentage of GDP, i.e. the cumulative adjustment required to adhere to the Stability
Programmes’ debt targets. Excesses are indicated in red. The results are based on 2000 simulated
shocks to the benchmark model.
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Figure 6: The probability distribution of the additionally required, yearly adjustments to the
primary balance as a percentage of GDP that are required in order to adhere to the targets set in
the Stability Programmes. Cases in need of corrective action are indicated in red. The results are
based on 2000 simulated shocks to the benchmark model.
Moreover, the case for Germany and - to a lesser extent - Belgium show that even in the case of
strict targets, much uncertainty remains. Importantly, this uncertainty is not necessarily the result
of primary budget blunders. In fact, ceteris paribus and under the assumption that historical fiscal
reaction is a good proxy for governmental behavior, Germany for instance is expected to obtain its
primary balance goals with certainty. Generally, the impact of shocks on the estimated primary
balance remains limited, although great uncertainty remains for its debt rate, which could possibly
require further adjustment. Therefore, the effect of interest rates and the impact of output in the
denominator prove to be decisive.
Table 10: Countries’ Infringement Risks
i. Infringement of the Stability Programme
Germany France Italy Spain Belgium
2015 6.6% 0.4% 32.3% 12.8% 12.3%
2016 4.9% 0.8% 40.7% 15.6% 23.3%
2017 3.7% 1.2% 44.2% 19.5% 34.5%
2018 2.8% n.a. 63.8% n.a. n.a.
ii. Infringement of the Debt Brake
Germany France Italy Spain Belgium
2015 0.2% 98.7% 90.1% 97.1% 80.3%
2016 0.4% 38.7% 52.6% 49.1% 43.4%
2017 0.9% 19.4% 48.2% 36.7% 35.6%
2018 0.7% 11.0% 48.0% 26.5% 33.1%
iii. Infringement of MTO Adjustment Path
Germany France Italy Spain Belgium
2015 1.2% 0.2% 11.8% 0.2% 0.5%
2016 21.7% 4.4% 18.4% 9.5% 2.9%
2017 67.4% 25.9% 44.2% 27.8% 29.8%
2018 87.0% 48.4% 52.1% 49.1% 55.3%
Notes: The risks convey the probabilities that member states do not
reach (i) the debt level resulting from the targets set in their Stability
Programmes; (ii) the debt rate that follows the debt brake; and (iii)
a sufficiently large cyclically adjusted budget balance (CABB) to allow
them to move towards their MTO at a sufficient pace. Results are based
on 2000 simulated shocks to the benchmark model as described above.
To prevent ending up in the EDP, countries with a debt rate exceeding 60% of GDP must
moreover reduce this difference by a minimum of 5 pp. per year over a period of three years.24 The
probability for the examined member states to achieve the debt levels set out by this debt brake rule
are included in table 10 as well. In contrast to the first infringement measure, this measure does
account for the ambitiousness of the targets set by countries. For example, Germany now clearly
24For example, if the debt-to-GDP ratio is 80% in the year preceding the last year, then for the period covering
the last year and the subsequent two years it should decline with at least: 0.05 * 20% = 1.0 percentage point per
year, resulting in a limit of 77.0% three years later.
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does better in comparison to France and Spain. Still, due to the importance of the initial distance
from the debt target, countries with a lower initial debt level are less burdened to take action.
Therefore, they will achieve their objectives more easily. While Germany thus has little chance of
flouting the debt brake, great uncertainty remains for countries already under strict supervision
(e.g. Belgium).
Finally, all Member States must reach their MTOs or be on an appropriate adjustment path
towards them, with an annual improvement in their structural balance of 0.5% of GDP. The third
panel of table 10 shows the corresponding infringement risk measure. Not surprisingly, the likeli-
hood that a country does not achieve the required adjustment of its Cyclically Adjusted Budget
Balance (CABB) increases as the horizon period lengthens. Noteworthy, however, is the high short-
run uncertainty in Italian fiscal policy for meeting its goals. Consequently, this higher intrinsic
uncertainty of Italian fiscal policy may impel policy makers to enforce stricter surveillance in order
to hedge against disadvantageous outcomes.
4.3 Policy Uncertainty
Panel (f) of figure 3 included an illustrative comparison of the simulated changes in the Belgian
debt rate with its historical counterparts. It is noticeably more optimistic than those observed over
the full history of the series (1969-2013). Nonetheless, the kernel of the simulated changes in the
debt rate comes close to that of the evolutions since 1995.
The remaining differences can be explained by either (i) possible discrepancies between the
macroeconomic shocks simulated and those that occurred in practice or (ii) the uncertainty con-
cerning fiscal policy decisions not included so far. As shown in section 5, a comparison of the
benchmark model to that with bootstrapped macro shocks shows that the first option may be ex-
cluded as the primary reason. Policy makers may, however, deviate from historical fiscal reactions
for multiple reasons, thereby accounting for the slight bias observed in the simulations.
So far, deviations by policy makers from their historical behavior were left out of the picture
in the analysis. Nonetheless, the panel estimations from section 3.3 provide data on the deviations
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Figure 7: A comparison of the simulated changes in the debt rate for the period of 2014-2018 to
their historical values. The kernels of the simulated changes are based on 2.000 period-by-period
Monte Carlo simulations of the estimated model.
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observed in the past, i.e. the residuals. Adding an uncertainty component to the fiscal component
of the model has not been seen in earlier research, but adds to its insightfulness.
Specifically, in what follows I extend each period’s fiscal reaction with a random draw from
a normal distribution having the mean and standard deviation of the country’s residuals. This
improves the robustness of the results. For example, as illustrated in figure 7, the simulated changes
in the Belgian debt rate are more in line with those observed during recent decades.
Adding an additional source of uncertainty to the model straightforwardly results in a widening
of the fan charts of the evolution of the simulated debt stock as a percentage of GDP (see figure
8). The impact of this effect can be clearly observed from the VaR-measures for upward risk, which
are higher for all countries. France (15.2), Belgium (21.3) and Germany (28.1) still show a smaller
probability of upward risk than Spain (47.5) and Italy (73.1). Yet, the increase in upward risk
(expressed in terms of debt in 2018 as a percentage of GDP) is smallest for Italy: 5.8 in comparison
to 7.5 for France, 10.2 for Belgium, 12.4 for Germany and 16.7 for Spain.
Although the range of possible outcomes increases, the infringement risks as introduced in
subsection 4.2 do not necessarily change. After all, the upward risk only points to the undesirable,
but possible scenarios, without taking into account their likelihood. As long as the weight on such
scenarios within the distribution of all simulations turns out to be sufficiently small, the likelihood
Table 11: Countries’ Infringement Risks, incl. Policy Uncertainty
i. Infringement of the Stability Programme
Germany France Italy Spain Belgium
2015 7.6% +1.0 5.3% +4.9 23.4% -8.9 24.4% +11.6 6.3% -6.0
2016 5.2% +0.3 7.6% +6.8 30.8% -9.9 27.7% +12.1 9.4% -13.9
2017 3.8% +0.1 9.3% +8.1 34.3% -9.9 34.1% +14.6 10.4% -24.1
2018 2.7% -0.1 n.a. 38.6% -25.2 n.a. n.a.
ii. Infringement of the Debt Brake
Germany France Italy Spain Belgium
2015 0.6% +0.4 98.0% -0.7 81.6% -8.5 96.1% -1.0 49.5% -30.8
2016 1.0% +0.6 60.3% +21.6 41.8% -10.8 61.8% +12.7 17.5% -25.9
2017 0.8% -0.1 41.7% +22.3 40.2% -8.0 50.4% +13.7 11.4% -24.2
2018 0.9% +0.2 32.6% +21.6 39.5% -8.5 43.3% +16.8 8.5% -24.6
iii. Infringement of MTO Adjustment Path
Germany France Italy Spain Belgium
2015 32.0% +30.8 1.7% +1.5 12.7% +0.9 10.1% +9.9 6.8% +6.3
2016 47.0% +25.3 13.7% +9.3 21.4% +2.0 26.2% +16.7 16.7% +13.8
2017 61.6% -5.8 32.6% +6.7 45.5% +1.3 37.6% +9.8 41.0% +11.2
2018 66.1% -20.9 47.9% -0.5 54.2% +1.9 47.1% +2.0 60.5% +5.2
Notes: The risks convey the probabilities that member states do not reach (i) the debt level resulting from the
targets set in their Stability Programmes; (ii) the debt rate that follows the debt brake; and (iii) a sufficiently
large cyclically adjusted budget balance (CABB) required for them to move towards their MTO at a sufficient
pace. Results are based on 2000 simulated shocks to the benchmark model as described above. The changes as
a result of the inclusion of policy uncertainty in the model are given next to each figure.
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Figure 8: Yearly stochastic simulations of the public debt stock as a percentage of GDP for
2014-2018, including policy uncertainty. Shaded areas portray the deciles of the projections, with
different colors delineating different deciles. The deciles are based on 2.000 period-by-period Monte
Carlo simulations of the estimated model. Panel (f) plots the number of occurrences of a certain
debt rate for Belgium at the end of 2018.
of a breach does not necessarily have to increase. In fact, this is what we see in table 11, where
both the infringement risks with fiscal policy uncertainty in the model as well as the change with
respect to table 10 are shown.
4.4 Decomposition of the Variance of Public Debt
To illustrate the influence of the different sources of uncertainty I decompose the variance of the
simulations’ debt rates. In particular, table 12 shows the decomposition for Belgium. An overview
for all five countries is appended in table 21. The first three columns are simulated under the
assumption that only the corresponding column of the respective macro variable remains non-zero
in the factorized variance-covariance matrix. In the following columns the number of non-zero
columns is increased in a stepwise fashion. The seventh column represents the standard deviation
of the debt rate found under the full variance-covariance as portrayed by the results in figures 2
and 3. Finally, the policy uncertainty is added to the fiscal reaction.
As was already clear from the figures, the uncertainty increases the further ahead that predictions
are made. More striking, however, are the differences between countries. For instance, Italian debt is
characterized by a considerably larger uncertainty than its European counterparts. Percentage-wise
German and Spanish debt are also not without uncertainty. Belgian and French debt projections,
on the other hand, show relatively little uncertainty. The influence of policy uncertainty is limited
relative to that of the shocks in macroeconomic drivers. Nonetheless, it is not without importance,
especially for Germany and Spain.
Several causes of the cross-country differences in uncertainty are conceivable. First, both a
country’s automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy may differ. Nonetheless, except for possible
country fixed effects, the estimated reaction functions do not allow for respective differences in
uncertainty. Second, the VAR-model may not be able to estimate the actual data as reliable for
each member state. However, the limited differences in root mean squared errors (cf. table 16)
do not align with the discrepancies in uncertainty from the variance decompositions. Therefore,
differences are mainly to be attributed to historically larger variances in the macro variables of
some countries compared to others. Overall, the uncertainty is mainly the result of output shocks,
although considerable long-term effects of interest uncertainty also exist.
Table 12: Decomposition of the Public Debt’s Variance
Macroeconomic Uncertainty Policy Total
Individual Effects Correlation Full Uncert. Uncert.
gt pit rt {gt, pit} {gt, rt} {pit, rt} {gt, pit, rt}
2014 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.69 0.69 0.65 0.83 0.66 1.49
2015 2.11 0.88 0.60 2.32 2.20 1.06 2.37 0.82 3.19
2016 3.24 0.94 0.82 3.34 3.32 1.20 3.41 0.97 4.38
2017 3.84 1.33 1.27 4.01 4.04 1.79 4.22 1.17 5.39
2018 4.40 1.91 1.60 4.70 4.53 2.40 4.95 1.46 6.41
Notes: Figures denote standard deviations of the Belgian debt rate dt. The first three columns are simulated under the
assumption that only the corresponding column of the respective macro variable remains non-zero in the factorized variance-
covariance matrix. In the following columns the number of non-zero columns is increased stepwise. The seventh column
represents the standard deviation of the debt rate found under the full variance-covariance specified by equations (4) and
(5). Finally, policy uncertainty is added to the reaction function.
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5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Bootstrap
As a point of comparison shocks are bootstrapped in block - i.e. a vector for the three shocks is drawn
simultaneously - such that the generated kernel of the shocks approaches their historical distribution.
In particular, 10.000 vectors of shocks to the macro variables are drawn with replacement from the
historic residuals of the VAR models. As a means of illustration, the kernels of the bootstrapped
innovations of each macro variable are separately compared to the kernels from the original, normally
distributed model in figure 9.
Overall, the benchmark model performs relatively well. In fact, it does an outstanding job for
Germany. Nonetheless, the economic growth is underestimated in the case of Italy. As a result,
the end-of-year debt rate in 2018 is considerably less in the bootstrapped alternative (see figure
10). For the three other countries, the benchmark model has trouble capturing the distribution of
shocks in interest rates. Furthermore, the normal probability plots for each country-variable pair
are included in figure 13 in the appendix. They clearly illustrate that within reasonable bounds
the shocks are normal, but that the tails are not. In other words, the benchmark model is not
suitable to make inferences about extremities as it underestimates the probability of large upward
and downward shocks in favor of medium sized shocks.
5.2 Alternative Paths
As an alternative to using model (12) from table 4, other models could be used. To illustrate
the importance of the differences in the estimated coefficients of the reaction functions, I compare
several different specifications of the fiscal determinants.
Next to the benchmark dynamic GMM-model from table 4, the following alternative estimation
models considered are: (i) the dynamic LSDVC-model for the core countries (model (4) from table
4); (ii) a combination of the dynamic LSDVC-models for the expenditures and revenues of the core
countries (models (9) from tables 6 and 7); and (iii) a re-estimation of the dynamic LSDVC-model
for the core countries using output growth instead of the output gap.
As illustrated by figure 11 the main difference between the different estimation models’ paths
is to be found by switching from the output gap to output growth as an explanatory variable.
In all cases, doing so worsens expectations about the future path of the public debt stock as a
percentage of GDP. Furthermore, it is to be noted that, in contrast to the benchmark shocks, the
use of bootstrapped shocks may further deteriorate prospects. The German projections seem the
most robust, since the bootstrapped paths only differ by a negligible amount. This is in line with
the expectations based on figure 9. For the other countries, however, this does not appear to be the
case. In panel (f) of figure 11 I illustrate the case for Belgium. Italian prospects, as an exception,
brighten as a result of more favorable bootstrapped growth shocks.
6 Concluding Remarks
The significance of disentangling how fiscal policy uncertainty shapes economic outcomes is now
universally accepted. Consequently, there is a need for forward looking policy instruments taking
into account the uncertainty as well as the institutional and macro-financial factors underlying them.
Nonetheless, the respective literature has mainly focused on the reaction coefficient of the primary
balance as regards the debt-to-GDP ratio and has ignored the direct implications for the fiscal
disciplinary rules imposed in practice. This paper therefore builds upon the existing methodology
and comes to enhanced stochastic projections of EMU member states’ public finances.
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Figure 9: Comparison of the kernels of the innovations to Xt (at the end of 2018) based on
(a) 2.000 period-by-period Monte Carlo simulations of the estimated models from their estimated
covariance matrix, Ωˆ; and on (b) 10.000 block bootstrapped innovations from the estimated models’
historic residuals.
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Figure 10: Bootstrapped stochastic simulations of the public debt stock as a percentage of GDP
at the end of 2018. Each histogram plots the number of occurrences of a certain debt rate based on
10.000 period-by-period Monte Carlo simulations of the estimated model using block bootstrapped
innovations. The full line portrays the fitted kernel. Panel (f) illustrates the movement of the
distribution over the period of 2014-2018 for the case of Belgium.
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Figure 11: Panels (a) to (e) show a comparison of the expected paths of the public debt stock as
a percentage of GDP based on the different fiscal reaction functions’ stochastic simulations. Panel
(f) contains a comparison of the benchmark estimated projections for Belgium to its respective
alternative with bootstrapped shocks.
The estimation of fiscal determinants shows that the responsiveness of the primary balance to
economic fluctuations is generally found to be larger in the core European countries. Discretionary
policy, in its turn, is found to be procyclical on average, especially in peripheral countries. The
long-term interest rate is not found to be significant and the evidence of fiscal drag through bracket
creep is ambiguous. Including a measure of the institutional guarantees for fiscal discipline, on the
other hand, does seem to have a favorable impact on a country’s primary balance. In particular,
incorporating the fiscal rule index into the model results in findings that are in accordance with
earlier findings that suggest the effectiveness of stronger fiscal rules. Fiscal policy adjustments,
however, differ significantly for public revenues and primary expenditures.
Additionally, the paper employs time series analysis to characterize the joint dynamics of the
uncertainty existing for economic growth, inflation and interest rates. This, in combination with
the estimation of fiscal determinants, allows for the application of a Monte Carlo-based approach
to derive the distribution of expected fiscal realizations. The benchmark model is found to perform
well. For example, the overall macro projections resulting from the vector autoregression differ little
from those used by national administrations in drawing up their Stability Programmes.
As the result of historically larger variances in its macro drivers, Italian debt is found to be
characterized by a considerably larger uncertainty than its European counterparts. German and
Spanish debt are also not without uncertainty. Spain, for example, is the most likely not to live up
to the debt brake in the medium-run. However, using bootstrapped shocks deteriorates prospects
for all countries but Germany. Furthermore, Germany, France and Belgium show a much smaller
upward risk than Spain and Italy.
Interestingly, the targets set out in German, Italian and Belgian Stability Programmes are very
close to the model’s expected budgetary paths, especially in the short-run. Hence, the programme
goals set by these countries seem to follow historical fiscal behavior. French and Spanish goals,
nonetheless, provide relatively more fiscal leeway in the short-run. In all cases, the choice to include
economic growth instead of the output gap in the fiscal reaction function worsens expectations about
the future path of the debt rate.
Finally, three risk measures that quantify the likelihood of fiscal rule infringements are set forth.
A first measure captures the distribution of the possibly required adjustments of fiscal policy for
adhering to the Stability Programmes’ targets. It seems to favor the French and Spanish prospects.
The caveat is that this result is driven by their programmes being relatively less ambitious. The
second indicator, quantifying the probability that the member states achieve the debt levels set out
by the European debt brake rule, does account for the ambitiousness of the targets. Consequently,
while Germany is found to have little chance of flouting the debt brake, it points to great uncertainty
for countries already under strict supervision (e.g. Belgium). Thirdly, the risk that a country does
not achieve the required adjustment of its cyclically adjusted budget balance in order to be on the
appropriate path towards its medium-term objective is analyzed. In particular, it shows that Italian
fiscal policy portrays a disturbingly high short-run uncertainty in comparison to other member
states. This higher intrinsic uncertainty is valid ground for impelling policy makers to enforce
stricter surveillance to hedge against disadvantageous outcomes.
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Appendix
Table 13: Data Descriptives of the Non-fiscal determinants
Definition Country Root Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
gt Real GDP growth rate
1 DE I(0) 0.0113 0.0181 -0.0394 0.0744
FR I(0) 0.0107 0.0100 -0.0270 0.0463
IT I(0) 0.0139 0.0220 -0.0657 0.0794
ES I(0) 0.0136 0.0204 -0.0633 0.0843
BE I(0) 0.0109 0.0105 -0.0261 0.0472
pit Consumer price index
2 DE I(1) 0.0164 0.0093 -0.0060 0.0420
FR I(1) 0.0205 0.0130 -0.0050 0.0590
IT I(1) 0.0257 0.0100 0.0010 0.0480
ES I(1) 0.0257 0.0094 -0.0100 0.0460
BE I(1) 0.0197 0.0109 -0.0120 0.0520
rt EMU convergence DE I(1) 0.0559 0.0221 0.0134 0.1056
criterion bond yields3 FR I(0) 0.0700 0.0378 0.0186 0.1686
IT I(1) 0.0908 0.0504 0.0309 0.2121
ES I(0) 0.0878 0.0464 0.0292 0.1781
BE I(0) 0.0685 0.0321 0.0199 0.1381
1 The series for France, Spain and Belgium obtained from the Eurostat Statistics Database were
deseasonalized and corrected for the number of working days beforehand. For Germany and Italy
the series obtained from Eurostat were already corrected for the number of working days, but still
required manual deseasonalization.
2 Data obtained from OECD.Stat, with original index set at 100 in 2010.
3 Data obtained from the Eurostat Statistics Database.
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Table 14: Data Descriptives of the Fiscal Determinants (as a % of GDP)1
AT BE DK FI FR DE IE
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ
Total revenues 48.92 0.81 48.74 0.98 54.54 0.75 53.27 1.50 50.29 1.03 44.12 1.09 35.41 1.81
Income & wealth taxes 13.10 0.60 16.17 0.52 29.07 0.75 17.19 1.25 10.96 1.28 11.31 0.64 13.18 0.66
Production & import taxes 14.49 0.41 12.74 0.23 16.89 0.48 13.46 0.57 15.27 0.46 10.60 0.28 12.24 1.14
Employers’ social contrib. 7.72 0.44 10.37 0.32 0.44 0.10 8.87 0.42 12.72 0.29 8.15 0.45 4.18 0.29
Households’ social contrib. 7.61 0.13 5.41 0.14 1.17 0.28 3.41 0.43 5.39 0.71 9.33 0.51 1.23 0.15
Property income 1.28 0.12 0.94 0.18 2.17 0.39 3.48 0.44 0.83 0.16 0.79 0.12 0.93 0.41
Capital taxes 0.06 0.06 0.59 0.17 0.21 0.03 0.26 0.05 0.46 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.05
Other 4.66 0.70 2.52 0.35 4.58 0.39 6.59 0.80 4.67 0.20 3.78 0.28 3.48 0.49
Total expend. 51.00 1.61 50.35 2.18 54.06 2.79 51.98 4.11 54.16 1.55 45.65 1.84 37.09 4.52
Primary expend. 47.74 1.43 45.11 3.01 51.08 2.49 49.78 3.89 51.37 1.71 42.81 1.61 34.61 4.00
Social benefits & transfers 24.75 0.68 24.55 1.62 21.59 1.23 21.59 2.02 26.07 1.64 26.56 0.85 14.18 2.95
Employees’ compensation 10.96 0.37 11.63 0.43 16.16 0.66 13.59 0.76 12.91 0.25 8.05 0.41 10.02 1.15
Intermediate consumption 5.88 0.50 3.76 0.21 8.17 0.90 9.04 1.37 4.93 0.23 3.96 0.39 5.22 0.33
Capital formation 2.95 0.41 2.17 0.15 2.98 0.31 3.81 0.27 3.98 0.16 2.21 0.20 3.30 0.91
Subsidies 1.87 0.36 1.96 0.63 2.07 0.15 1.49 0.34 1.52 0.15 1.33 0.35 1.03 0.12
Other 1.33 0.43 1.04 0.24 0.12 0.19 0.25 0.08 1.96 0.34 0.71 0.55 0.86 0.27
Interest burden 3.26 0.39 5.24 1.83 2.98 1.42 2.19 1.01 2.78 0.34 2.84 0.38 2.48 1.39
Primary balance 1.18 1.32 3.63 2.61 3.46 2.51 3.48 3.28 -1.08 1.46 1.31 1.48 0.80 4.84
Cycl. adj. prim. bal.2 0.59 1.14 3.12 2.46 3.01 1.29 3.28 2.35 -1.08 1.39 0.61 1.98 -1.05 7.69
Fiscal rule index3 0.07 0.62 0.24 0.21 1.26 0.46 0.67 0.29 0.30 0.64 0.65 0.32 -0.90 0.10
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Table 14 (continued): Data Descriptives of the Fiscal Determinants (as a % of GDP)1
IT LU NL PT ES SE UK
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ
Total revenues 45.03 1.30 43.08 1.07 43.39 1.04 40.46 1.81 38.44 1.32 54.23 2.41 38.55 1.26
Income & wealth taxes 13.99 0.70 14.55 0.89 10.86 0.54 8.86 0.75 10.16 0.80 19.36 1.21 14.90 0.75
Production & import taxes 13.81 1.01 12.76 0.52 11.33 0.44 13.78 0.54 10.86 0.95 22.51 0.70 12.40 0.48
Employers’ social contrib. 8.99 0.55 10.09 0.59 4.70 0.88 7.49 0.62 9.21 0.21 3.68 0.70 4.45 0.30
Households’ social contrib. 3.83 0.35 1.34 0.08 9.71 1.51 3.58 0.20 3.41 0.14 0.98 0.97 3.11 0.19
Property income 0.64 0.15 1.81 0.37 2.44 0.48 0.96 0.23 1.09 0.33 2.38 0.60 0.82 0.29
Capital taxes 0.33 0.34 0.12 0.04 0.28 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.41 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.29 0.34
Other 3.44 0.16 2.41 0.19 4.08 0.13 5.73 0.66 3.29 0.21 5.25 0.39 2.58 0.58
Total expend. 48.33 1.79 41.09 2.38 44.77 2.11 45.28 2.87 40.92 2.76 54.14 3.72 42.22 3.37
Primary expend. 42.28 2.10 40.74 2.36 41.97 2.25 41.83 2.93 38.09 2.78 51.63 2.49 39.64 3.46
Social benefits & transfers 20.81 1.66 22.42 1.47 21.28 1.64 17.86 3.07 16.93 1.91 20.81 1.13 15.69 1.02
Employees’ compensation 10.42 0.28 7.99 0.42 9.23 0.35 13.35 0.76 10.46 0.65 12.75 0.48 10.23 0.62
Intermediate consumption 4.95 0.31 3.41 0.25 6.21 0.48 5.03 0.64 4.68 0.66 8.44 0.44 9.94 1.64
Capital formation 2.82 0.24 4.19 0.50 3.89 0.22 4.21 0.92 3.92 0.72 4.35 0.29 2.40 0.55
Subsidies 1.41 0.18 1.64 0.12 1.35 0.14 0.95 0.25 1.06 0.09 1.79 0.58 0.53 0.09
Other 1.87 0.42 1.09 0.48 0.02 0.25 0.44 0.33 1.05 0.28 3.48 0.43 0.85 0.17
Interest burden 6.05 2.18 0.35 0.11 2.79 1.16 3.46 0.94 2.83 1.14 2.51 1.51 2.57 0.57
Primary balance 2.75 1.91 2.34 2.20 1.42 2.38 -1.37 2.28 0.34 3.85 2.60 2.23 -1.09 3.31
Cycl. adj. prim. bal.2 2.62 1.76 2.35 1.50 1.14 2.19 -1.58 2.43 -0.51 2.79 2.72 1.69 -1.13 2.63
Fiscal rule index3 -0.31 0.42 0.90 0.85 1.12 0.02 -0.43 0.48 1.01 1.16 1.57 1.18 1.45 1.14
1 All fiscal data were obtained from the centralized national accounts in the Eurostat Statistics Database.
2 The cyclical correction was obtained using data from AMECO, the annual macro-economic database of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and
Financial Affairs.
3 The fiscal rule index (FRI) was designed by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) of the European Commission. The full database covering
national numerical fiscal rules can be downloaded freely from its online “Fiscal governance in the EU Member States” portal.
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Table 15: Model Selection Criteria and Tests
Germany: Loglikelihood Ratio Tests
AIC BIC LLF a. b. c. d.
a. VAR(2) -2602.3 -2532.4 1325.2 - 0 0 0
b. VAR(4) -2631.1 -2508.7 1357.5 - 0 0
c. VAR(6) -2639.7 -2465.0 1379.9 - 1
d. VAR(8) -2625.9 -2398.7 1390.9 -
France: Loglikelihood Ratio Tests
AIC BIC LLF a. b. c. d.
a. VAR(2) -2746.1 -2676.0 1397.0 - 0 0 0
b. VAR(4) -2776.8 -2654.1 1430.4 - 0 0
c. VAR(6) -2776.2 -2601.0 1448.1 - 0
d. VAR(8) -2777.4 -2549.6 1466.7 -
Italy: Loglikelihood Ratio Tests
AIC BIC LLF a. b. c. d.
a. VAR(2) -2523.4 -2453.3 1285.7 - 0 0 0
b. VAR(4) -2554.2 -2431.6 1319.1 - 0 0
c. VAR(6) -2550.5 -2375.3 1335.3 - 0
d. VAR(8) -2566.4 -2338.6 1361.2 -
Spain: Loglikelihood Ratio Tests
AIC BIC LLF a. b. c. d.
a. VAR(2) -2407.3 -2337.2 1227.7 - 0 0 0
b. VAR(4) -2425.5 -2302.9 1254.8 - 0 0
c. VAR(6) -2414.9 -2239.7 1267.5 - 1
d. VAR(8) -2404.8 -2177.0 1280.4 -
Belgium: Loglikelihood Ratio Tests
AIC BIC LLF a. b. c. d.
a. VAR(2) -2712.0 -2641.9 1380.0 - 0 0 0
b. VAR(4) -2731.7 -2609.1 1407.9 - 1 0
c. VAR(6) -2716.8 -2541.6 1418.4 - 0
d. VAR(8) -2752.1 -2524.4 1454.1 -
Notes: AIC denotes the Akaike information criterion, BIC denotes the Bayesian information
criterion and LLF denotes the loglikelihood function with the maximum likelihood estimates of
the corresponding model parameters. The given selection criteria apply to all models in both
their reduced-form as well as their recursive form. The model specifications can be compared
bilaterally using the loglikelihood ratio test. A “1” dummy indicates that the column model of
the test is rejected in favor of the row model of the test with a default 5% tolerance, and vice
versa.
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Table 16: Root Mean Squared Errors of Simulated Out-of-sample Forecasts
GDP growth Inflation Interest Rate
VAR(4) VAR(6) VAR(8) VAR(4) VAR(6) VAR(8) VAR(4) VAR(6) VAR(8)
Germany: Full window 0.0193 0.0188 0.0200 0.0029 0.0030 0.0030 0.0034 0.0033 0.0033
2 quarters 0.0148 0.0153 0.0163 0.0032 0.0031 0.0033 0.0033 0.0030 0.0029
4 quarters 0.0151 0.0149 0.0164 0.0032 0.0031 0.0033 0.0035 0.0033 0.0033
8 quarters 0.0203 0.0182 0.0192 0.0030 0.0030 0.0028 0.0035 0.0032 0.0032
France: Full window 0.0031 0.0030 0.0043 0.0029 0.0028 0.0036 0.0104 0.0105 0.0087
2 quarters 0.0024 0.0038 0.0047 0.0034 0.0032 0.0032 0.0045 0.0050 0.0051
4 quarters 0.0021 0.0030 0.0039 0.0034 0.0034 0.0032 0.0056 0.0073 0.0053
8 quarters 0.0026 0.0032 0.0034 0.0039 0.0039 0.0034 0.0057 0.0069 0.0045
Italy: Full window 0.0066 0.0088 0.0112 0.0044 0.0049 0.0059 0.0055 0.0058 0.0052
2 quarters 0.0070 0.0083 0.0135 0.0041 0.0045 0.0046 0.0056 0.0058 0.0053
4 quarters 0.0066 0.0072 0.0100 0.0046 0.0047 0.0047 0.0056 0.0053 0.0051
8 quarters 0.0073 0.0086 0.0099 0.0052 0.0054 0.0057 0.0053 0.0052 0.0049
Spain: Full window 0.0104 0.0073 0.0081 0.0057 0.0058 0.0078 0.0084 0.0131 0.0096
2 quarters 0.0086 0.0072 0.0071 0.0052 0.0051 0.0060 0.0073 0.0078 0.0089
4 quarters 0.0109 0.0084 0.0090 0.0052 0.0052 0.0059 0.0106 0.0106 0.0123
8 quarters 0.0092 0.0087 0.0095 0.0061 0.0063 0.0072 0.0168 0.0175 0.0131
Belgium: Full window 0.0044 0.0042 0.0046 0.0052 0.0050 0.0063 0.0135 0.0154 0.0144
2 quarters 0.0037 0.0055 0.0058 0.0053 0.0052 0.0060 0.0055 0.0059 0.0053
4 quarters 0.0035 0.0043 0.0049 0.0056 0.0057 0.0053 0.0093 0.0099 0.0072
8 quarters 0.0038 0.0042 0.0041 0.0065 0.0066 0.0060 0.0107 0.0119 0.0088
Notes: Entries are the root mean squared error of forecasts computed for the considered vector autoregression models. Each estimation was done using
data from 1980Q1 through the beginning of the forecast period, 2009Q4.
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Table 17: Static Fiscal Reaction Function: Alternative Specifications
Alternative Output Measure: GDP Growth HAC-robust Standard Errors
FE IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
di,t−1 0.02 0.03** 0.02 0.05** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.03* 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
gi,t 0.42*** 0.20** 0.26 0.18** 0.78*** 0.27*** 0.22 0.23*** 0.73*** 0.34*** 0.43*** 0.33***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.23) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
pii,t 0.33 0.26 0.25
(0.32) (0.27) (0.19)
ri,t -0.03 -0.01 -0.13
(0.20) (0.19) (0.11)
frii,t 0.63* 0.62** 0.64***
(0.34) (0.30) (0.24)
Country FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No of Obs. 449 449 282 421 448 448 280 420 397 422 280 394
No of Instr. 3 3 5 4 5 3 5 4
Hansen test 0.191 0.038 0.018 0.026 0.000 0.141 0.727 0.269
Reduced F 84.12 39.29 62.17 35.44 166.79 430.13 121.92 361.37
Adjusted R2 54.1% 66.1% 76.4% 69.5% 50.3% 66.4% 76.8% 70.2% 59.8% 68.7% 77.0% 72.3%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted primary budget balance (pbi,t) of the respective countries. Standard errors are noted in parentheses:
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Country-clustered standard errors are denoted in columns (1)-(8). Arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation
robust standard errors are reported in columns (9) through (12). Since fixed effects are included, the table states the p-value corresponding to the F -test
testing the null hypothesis that all country or time effects are jointly zero. For the instrumental variable regressions the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen tests for
overidentifying restrictions are reported, as well as the F -statistic of the reduced form.
45
Table 18: Dynamic Fiscal Reaction Function: Alternative Output Measure (GDP Growth)
LSDVC IV-GMM
GMM-diff GMM-sys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
pbi,t−1 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.64*** 0.73*** 0.83*** 0.62*** 0.58** 0.62*** 0.65*** 0.58*** 0.61***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.16) (0.22) (0.24) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06)
di,t−1 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.00 0.03 0.11* 0.12** -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
gi,t 0.31*** 0.09** 0.08 0.09** 0.38*** 0.23*** 0.38* -0.07 0.38*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.20***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.22) (0.14) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06)
pii,t 0.29** 0.09 0.99 -0.02
(0.14) (0.06) (0.66) (0.21)
ri,t -0.03 0.02 0.10
(0.12) (0.34) (0.09)
frii,t 0.38** -0.36 0.40**
(0.17) (0.86) (0.19)
Country FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time FE 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.986 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
No of Obs. 444 444 280 416 415 415 254 387 444 444 280 416
No of Instr. 7 11 11 12 14 18 18 20
Hansen J-test 0.484 0.258 0.393 0.128 0.364 0.752 0.520 0.562
Reduced F 11.61 26.31 22.69 12.84 21.02 65.26 33.13 25.57
Goodness-of-fit 73.7% 78.6% 85.1% 81.3% 69.3% 73.2% 27.9% 34.8% 55.8% 67.4% 73.0% 71.6%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted primary budget balance (pbi,t) of the respective countries. Standard errors are noted in parentheses: *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In columns (1)-(4) bootstrapped standard errors following the bias-corrected alternative by Bruno (2005) are reported. For the
IV-GMM models in columns (5)-(12) two-step Windmeijer’s (2005) robust standard errors are reported. In the case that fixed effects are present the table states the
p-value corresponding to the F -test testing the null hypothesis that all country or time effects are jointly zero. For the instrumental variable regressions the p-values
of the Sargan-Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions are reported, as well as the F -statistic of the reduced form. The goodness-of-fit is the squared correlation
coefficient between the actual and predicted values of the primary balance (see e.g. Bloom et al., 2007).
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Table 19: Static Fiscal Reaction Function: Comparison of Subsets
FE IV-2SLS
Core Per. Full Core Per. Full
di,t−1 0.02 0.10** 0.05** 0.04* 0.09*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
gi,t 0.51** 0.22** 0.28*** 0.64*** 0.10 0.33***
(0.20) (0.09) (0.08) (0.16) (0.12) (0.11)
frii,t 0.60* 0.61 0.68* 0.57** 0.41 0.64*
(0.31) (0.50) (0.34) (0.27) (0.41) (0.34)
Country FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time FE 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No of Obs. 237 166 403 236 158 394
No of Instr. 4 4 4
Hansen test 0.993 0.205 0.281
Reduced F 155.74 48.47 361.37
Adjusted R2 76.9% 59.3% 70.7% 77.7% 59.3% 72.3%
Notes: The dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted primary budget balance
(pbi,t) of the respective countries. Country-clustered standard errors are noted in
parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Since fixed effects are included, the
table states the p-value corresponding to the F -test testing the null hypothesis that all
country or time effects are jointly zero. For the instrumental variable regressions the
p-values of the Sargan-Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions are reported, as well
as the F -statistic of the reduced form.
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Figure 12: The cyclically unadjusted primary balance as a cubic function of the lagged debt rate
for the full panel as estimated in table 8.
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Table 20: Deciles of the Stochastic Public Debt Simulations
DE FR BE
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
0% 68.39 55.73 45.92 37.19 30.07 89.17 82.13 77.72 73.94 68.32 99.98 92.30 86.83 82.36 77.89
10% 70.84 62.15 54.63 47.48 41.18 90.51 86.35 83.05 79.62 75.65 101.70 96.29 92.86 89.60 85.39
20% 71.31 63.50 56.39 49.93 44.06 90.87 87.14 84.14 81.02 77.27 102.03 97.36 94.28 91.15 87.52
30% 71.63 64.42 58.04 51.65 45.93 91.10 87.74 85.04 82.02 78.55 102.32 98.09 95.28 92.44 88.93
40% 71.90 65.25 59.27 53.21 47.69 91.30 88.37 85.80 83.00 79.77 102.55 98.75 96.21 93.51 90.36
50% 72.17 66.09 60.49 54.66 49.39 91.49 88.92 86.52 83.80 80.64 102.75 99.36 97.02 94.71 91.45
60% 72.44 66.89 61.80 56.26 51.21 91.70 89.44 87.19 84.59 81.62 102.96 99.94 98.01 95.75 92.78
70% 72.71 67.80 63.01 58.01 53.25 91.90 90.00 87.93 85.61 82.64 103.17 100.61 98.89 96.79 94.18
80% 73.03 69.02 64.70 60.08 55.77 92.12 90.66 88.87 86.57 83.93 103.41 101.37 100.03 98.43 95.98
90% 73.49 70.53 66.96 63.20 59.24 92.45 91.61 90.05 87.97 85.51 103.81 102.50 101.66 100.34 98.37
100% 75.50 77.58 78.17 79.59 76.64 94.80 95.99 95.67 94.92 94.41 105.25 107.40 109.28 109.46 110.90
IT ES
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
0% 118.20 98.54 77.49 60.67 46.45 86.67 73.48 63.33 52.55 41.51
10% 122.08 112.24 100.85 88.78 79.09 90.27 83.51 76.10 68.89 61.88
20% 123.00 115.91 106.85 96.58 88.87 90.93 85.79 79.54 73.47 67.14
30% 123.62 118.26 111.12 103.28 96.52 91.41 87.65 82.34 77.17 71.40
40% 124.18 120.17 115.00 108.61 103.71 91.78 89.12 85.03 79.93 75.24
50% 124.62 122.19 118.41 113.76 109.99 92.17 90.55 87.16 82.93 78.81
60% 125.10 124.14 122.00 119.11 118.47 92.56 92.05 89.50 85.85 82.31
70% 125.61 126.32 126.07 125.25 126.01 92.94 93.63 92.05 89.40 86.39
80% 126.24 128.78 130.86 132.59 135.54 93.41 95.58 95.25 93.36 90.89
90% 127.00 131.87 137.63 143.04 151.69 94.04 98.40 100.42 100.29 98.96
100% 130.36 149.49 178.90 227.08 298.13 97.66 111.60 134.89 146.71 157.26
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Figure 13: Normal probability plots of the innovations to Xt (at the end of 2018) based on 10.000
block bootstrapped innovations from the estimated models’ historic residuals.
Table 21: Decomposition of the Variance of Public Debt
Macroeconomic Uncertainty Policy Uncertainty Total Uncertainty
Individual Effects Correlation Full
gt pit rt {gt, pit} {gt, rt} {pit, rt} {gt, pit, rt} in % {pbt} in %
Germany:
2014 0.95 0.38 0.38 1.01 1.02 0.54 1.08 2% 0.82 1% 1.90 3%
2015 3.13 0.74 0.42 3.15 3.16 0.86 3.30 5% 0.96 1% 4.26 7%
2016 4.62 1.20 0.52 4.67 4.69 1.26 4.85 8% 1.18 2% 6.03 10%
2017 5.79 1.65 0.56 5.85 5.87 1.68 6.04 12% 1.47 3% 7.51 14%
2018 6.66 2.06 0.57 6.71 6.66 2.08 6.92 15% 1.80 4% 8.72 19%
France:
2014 0.51 0.22 0.51 0.54 0.71 0.54 0.75 1% 0.35 0% 1.10 1%
2015 1.86 0.43 0.74 1.82 1.92 0.85 1.98 2% 0.55 1% 2.53 3%
2016 2.59 0.43 0.94 2.56 2.75 1.01 2.77 3% 0.73 1% 3.50 4%
2017 3.04 0.52 1.31 3.00 3.25 1.40 3.37 4% 0.86 1% 4.23 5%
2018 3.43 0.91 1.72 3.47 3.69 1.99 3.92 5% 1.07 1% 4.99 6%
Italy:
2014 1.59 0.08 1.06 1.63 1.87 1.04 1.88 2% 0.44 0% 2.32 2%
2015 7.36 0.45 2.67 7.44 7.64 2.60 7.75 6% 0.31 0% 8.06 7%
2016 13.68 1.22 5.84 13.86 14.79 5.66 14.72 13% 0.43 0% 15.15 13%
2017 19.29 2.27 10.80 19.67 22.34 10.37 22.08 21% -0.16 0% 21.92 21%
2018 24.78 3.78 16.19 25.70 30.35 15.65 30.26 30% -0.81 -1% 29.45 29%
Spain:
2014 1.16 0.49 0.85 1.22 1.41 0.94 1.52 2% 1.03 1% 2.55 3%
2015 5.61 1.09 1.31 5.70 5.72 1.71 5.91 6% 0.96 1% 6.87 7%
2016 8.86 1.77 1.77 9.09 9.02 2.54 9.40 10% 1.20 1% 10.60 12%
2017 11.20 2.63 2.25 11.66 11.38 3.49 11.99 14% 1.54 2% 13.53 16%
2018 13.01 3.51 2.78 13.60 13.06 4.49 13.88 16% 2.19 3% 16.07 19%
Belgium:
2014 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.69 0.69 0.65 0.83 1% 0.66 1% 1.49 1%
2015 2.11 0.88 0.60 2.32 2.20 1.06 2.37 2% 0.82 1% 3.19 2%
2016 3.24 0.94 0.82 3.34 3.32 1.20 3.41 4% 0.97 1% 4.38 4%
2017 3.84 1.33 1.27 4.01 4.04 1.79 4.22 5% 1.17 1% 5.39 5%
2018 4.40 1.91 1.60 4.70 4.53 2.40 4.95 6% 1.46 2% 6.41 6%
Notes: Figures denote standard deviations of the debt rate dt under different scenarios. The first three columns are simulated under the assumption that only the
corresponding column of the respective macro variable remains non-zero in the factorized variance-covariance matrix. In the following columns the number of non-zero
columns is increased stepwise. The seventh and eight columns represent the standard deviation of the debt rate found under the full variance-covariance specified by
equations (4) and (5), both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the average debt rate simulated. Finally, policy uncertainty is added to the reaction function and
is also allowed to counterbalance macro uncertainty.
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